[EM] Re: Strong Favourite Betrayal Criterion at last!

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Wed Apr 2 12:58:26 PST 2003

Good example!

I passed over this one in my quest for the Strong FBC because, as you
point out, optimal strategy sometimes requires not approving favorite,
which most folks would consider as betrayal of favorite.

But it does have its appeal as an honest way of eliciting sincere

It could be taken as the initial method in a sequence of methods in which
my recent method would be the second member, and the third member would
require the voters to (1) rank the candidates, (2) rank the pairs of
candidates, and (3) approve as many pairs of pairs of candidates as

Then the pair of pairs with the greatest approval would be sent to the
ballot rankings of pairs to determine the pair of candidates to be sent to
the ballot rankings of candidates to determine the winner of the election.

Perhaps this sequence could be used for theoretical purposes such as
scaffolding for the construction of a "Small Voting Machine."


On Thu, 3 Apr 2003, Chris Benham wrote:

> Forest,
> My answer to your question "Is there a simpler method that factors allof
> the strategy away from the rankings or ratings of the candidates?" is
> yes. Voters can rank  and also Approve whichever candidates they please,
> not even neccessarily Approving the candidate they rank as number1.
> The method  is to have an IRV-like count, except that the candidates who
> are in turn eliminated are those who are the least Approved.
> For example, in a 3 candidate race in which you doubt that  Favourite
> can beat Worst  in a runoff, you might number the candidates  1.
> Favourite  2. Middle  3. Worst  , but  only  Approve Middle .
> Chris Benham

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