[Fwd: Re: [EM] Re: Strong FBC at last! ....Approval Runoff]

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Fri Apr 4 07:24:02 PST 2003

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [EM] Re: Strong FBC at last! ....Approval Runoff
Date: Sat, 05 Apr 2003 00:29:20 +0930
From: Chris Benham <chrisbenham at bigpond.com>
To: Alex Small <asmall at physics.ucsb.edu>
References: <3E8D148C.5080407 at bigpond.com> 
<1223. at taurik>

Certainly. Just for the sake of simplicity, I will give you the version 
which doesn't allow voters to give more than one candidate the same 
preference number.
Firstly count all the first preference votes. If  a candidate receives 
more than half of  the first preferences, then that candidate wins.
If  no candidate get a majority of first preferences, count  the 
approvals for each candidate.
Eliminate the candidate with the fewest approvals, and then 
("IRV-style") add the second preferences on the ballot papers which had 
the just-eliminated candidate number 1 to the first preference tallies 
of the remaining candidates.
If  that gives a candidate a majority of the votes cast minus the number 
of  "exhausted ballots" (first preference votes for the eliminated 
candidate with no second preference), then that candidate wins.
If not, eliminate the candidate with the next fewest approvals, and so on.
You work with 2 separate lists-- the list of candidates in order of how 
many approvals they received, and a list of  candidates' tallies based 
on the numbered preferences. It works just like IRV, except that instead 
of eliminating the candidate with the lowest tally of  votes, we 
eliminate the candidate with the least approvals.
I  hope that is clear. This is not a method I advocate-- the point of it 
is that all the strategising  is confined to the approvals  so that 
voters can never gain by numbering the candidates insincerely.
Chris Benham

Alex Small wrote:

>I don't quite follow the method that you describe.  Could you give me a
>simple, step-by-step description of the method and its ballots?

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