[EM] Winning votes truncation fullproof counter-example

Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Thu Sep 19 12:30:00 PDT 2002


To Mike, Adam, Alex and all winning votes criteria advocates...

Dear friends,

here follow the sincere preferences of 13 voters when they judge
candidates A (Adam), B (Bart) and C (no need for the joke).

2: A >B >C
4: A >C >B
2: B >A >C
3: B >C >A
2: C >A >B
0: C >B >A

With winning votes A (6) > C (5), then
                              B (5) > C (4), then
                              A (4) > B (2).
Note that A is the Condorcet Winner.
Margins as relative margins would produce the same result
with a different order.

The B >A >C voters (2) decide to believe Bart Ingles and truncate their
ballots to produce insincere votes,  namely B ballots.
With winning votes the pairwise comparisons become:
B (5) > C(4) and C(5) > A(4), then
A(4) > B(2).
Bart wins...
Note that margins and relative margins would preserve Adam's victory.

Do you surrender?

Please tell me where I am wrong or explain,
Steph.
PS: I expect to finish my Ph.D for January.
Anyone knows a place nearby Montreal with a job in a field like this?
Sorry for asking, but working with you guys is like being a member
of the Manathan project, except it can only do good.

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