RP with relative margins, with Approval features

[Sampo Syreeni]

On 2002-10-20, MIKE OSSIPOFF uttered to election-methods-list at eskimo.com:

>That's a strong claim. Can you verify it?

Considering that tactics like drowning seem to affect a number of strong
election methods, I'd join you in doubting such claims a bit. If the claim
holds, it's naturally sure there are other strategies. Whether they are
more likely to be employed than the ones known, nobody could know before
full disclosure. Still, the likelihood that one could come up with an
election method less likely to be attacked, strategically, than Condorcet
with appropriate pruning, seems remote to me, at the very best.

Really, I seem to think it's the proper time to introduce myself to the
list. I'm a 24-year old math student from Finland, a libertarian, and an
enthusiast in anything and everything concerning public policy and
collective decision making. My primary motivation in joining is my staunch
criticism of the naïve democratic process, which leads me to seek an
understanding behind its actual dynamics. In that regard, I'd think I'm an
atypical participant.

I believe I have an adequate understanding of the issues discussed
on-list, including the Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems, and most
of the actual strategies employed. As for an intuitive understanding of
their relative importance, I'm still pretty much in the dark. The same
goes for the details of PR variants of most well-known procedures.

I'm hoping to participate in the discussion, one day, but right now, I'm
thinking about relurking -- what talk there is seems to be going in a
direction foreign to me.
-- 
Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - mailto:decoy at iki.fi, tel:+358-50-5756111
student/math+cs/helsinki university, http://www.iki.fi/~decoy/front
openpgp: 050985C2/025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2

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