Yes/No Voting

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sat Nov 23 18:15:04 PST 2002





When i replied to this message as individual e-mail, i forgot to
send a copy to myself, and so i'm writing a new reply here, which
might be briefer than the original:


Alex--

you wrote:


MIKE OSSIPOFF said:
>But someone wrote to me suggesting a method that has both of those
>advantages: Yes/No voting:
>
>Each voter may give a candidate "Yes", "No", or nothing. A candidate's
>No votes are subtracted from his Yes votes, and the result is his
>score. The candidate with highest score wins.

I've sometimes used the name "Yes/No Voting" to describe Approval.
Saying that you indicate yes or no for each candidate and the candidate
with the most yeses wins seems more appealing to some people than saying
you vote for as many candidates as you want. Maybe the idea of multiple
votes evokes images of Chicago cemetaries, or Floridians voting for
Buchanan and Gore. In any case, "Yes/No Voting" seems an accurate
description of Approval.

i reply-

Well, when we call it 'votes', that makes it sound like a rule-violation
of plurality to some people. it't ingrained with some people that
1-person-1-vote means that if we call something a 'vote' then each
person must cast only one.

So yes, i think that asking people to vote 'yes' or 'no' would avoid
that 1-person-1-vote problem. Or proposing a point system in which
the voter may give to each candidate either 0 points or 1 point.
What do you say, Steph? Craig? Or proposing a CR with a range of
0-10, etc.

Steph has shown that i was right when i said that
Approval sometimes meets opposition because of a belief that it
violates 1-person-1-vote.

But when you suggest Approval as y/n, without the option of
giving someone neither, it's true that that Approval meaning of y/n
seems just as publicly acceptable as the more complicated -1,0,1.

-1,0,1 has the advantage of being more different from the Approval
definition that causes so much trouble with some people. if 0,1
looks more like Approval,then maybe they'll bring their Approval
prejudice to 0,1 CR. So an advantage of -1,0,1 is that it looks less
like Approval. But maybe 0,1  , the Approval interpretation of y/n,
won't trigger the 1-person-1-vote misperception. Steph, does 0,1
seem to violate 1 person 1 vote? how about -1,0,1?

you continued:


This method you propose seems more complicated in its description than
0, 1, 2 CR. Equivalent, yes, but in pitching an idea wording matters.


i reply:

True, when i worded it by talking about a subtraction. But what if
i just said to give point assignments of -1,0, or 1?

in one way, -1,0,1 is more complicated because it has a negative
number. in another way it's simpler because it's all ones and zero.
it's just negative, nothing, or positive. There's a simplicity in that.

>That's equivalent to CR, with -1, 0, 1. Which is equivalent to
>0, 1, 2 CR. Which of course is strategically equivalent to Approval.


you wrote:

I can think of a good reason for people to give less than full support
in CR:

With Approval or CR, people who believe that the front-runners have
"sold out" still have a tough decision, a decision only slightly easier
than the one they face with plurality. (Arguably they have the same
dilemma with ranked methods, when deciding if they should truncate.) Do
they support the "lesser weasel"?

A group of like-minded voters, perhaps acting on the advice of an
advocacy group, might give their "lesser weasel" 1 point out of 4, or
whatever. Say that "lesser weasel" wins narrowly. They can now say "On
election night your heart was fibrillating like Dick Cheney's. We've
shown that we're willing to work with you, and we can make the next
election night more pleasant for you if you impliment the following
policies..."

i reply:

Also, with -1,0,1, many nader-preferrers would give Gore a 0 instead
of a -1 or a 1, With 0,1 they'd have to choose between those 2,
and it would be easier to just give him a 0, so as to express all their
pairwise prefernces among nader, bush, and gore.

Some of the people giving Gore 0 would have given him a 1 in 0,1
and some would have given him a 0. So the flexibility of -1,0,1
could ease the decision for many voters, even if it isn't optimal
instrumental voting.

you continued:

The big difference between giving partial points and demanding
concessions versus giving no points and demanding concessions is that
the faction givin partial points (even 1 out of 4) has shown some
willingness to work with the candidate. The candidate has the
reasonable expectation of future support if he works with them. If they
hadn't supported him he might have written them off and concentrated on
wooing more voters in the center.

Also, these voters now have a stick as well as a carrot, as they can add
support, withdraw support, or stay where they are. The voters giveth,
and the voters taketh away.

i reply:

maybe, but isn't it also true that the voter who gives the Democrat
the lowest possible points assignment is using a meaner stick,and
giving the Democrats a better lesson? To the extent that the Dem
can count on something from progressives, he doesn't have to worry
so much about how he treats them. For instance, now,when he can count
on a full vote from them, he can safely completely ignore them,
except maybe during campaign-pretending time.


you continued:


The Greens face this problem right now. The Democrats' post-election
soul-searching has focused on the question "Focus on our liberal base or
fight for the center?" If the Dems concentrate on the center they're
essentially writing off the Greens, and the Greens have no leverage. If
we had CR, and the Greens gave the Dems at least partial support,
writing off the Greens would actually make the Dems worse off.

i reply:

But if the Greens gave the Dem the lowest possible points assignment,
then the Dems would really find out what happens when they ignore the
Greens. They'd know why they got minimum points from the Greens. They'd
know what to do if they want better from them.

Actually, this assumes that the Dems will improve.  Sure, they might
move a little way, in response to strategic need. But will they become
honest and stop taking bribes? Their contributer-owners might tell
them to improve their campaign-talk, and maybe even to improve how
they vote in Congress in some ways, but will they become honest and
stop taking bribes?

So i suggest that, instead of trying to influence or repair a party
that's contributor-owned, it's better to completely abandon them and
vote for honest candidates. Sure, right now it's always the Dem or
the Repub who wins, but maybe that won't always be so with a better
voting system. After all, plurality is known to artificially create
a 2-party system.

mike ossipoff









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