[EM] questions

[Alex Small]

There are two distinct considerations:  The technical/strategic aspects of
the method, and the political aspects.

>From a technical perspective, this method seems to be similar to my idea
of a machine that assigns you your optimal strategy given your reported
preferences and the strategies that it assigns to all other voters.  It
doesn't eliminate incentives for insincerity, but it doesn't produce all
that many.

Also, it is clearly monotonic.  It is clearly simple.  As long as
candidates give adequate information on how they will vote in various
situations there is a clear cause-and-effect relationship between your
vote and the outcome.

>From a political perspective, it seems like a substitute for a
parliamentary system, preserving the notion of coalition-building while
avoiding the instabilities of governments collapsing every six months in
Italy.  It would give a real voice to third parties:  After a close
election the trailing candidates could extract concessions from the top
contenders.

(I would have loved it if in 2000 Bush and Gore had actually been forced
to meet with the 3rd party candidates whom they refused to debate.  I can
just imagine Harry Browne asking Bush and Gore uncomfortable questions
about their previous drug use and stances on drug prohibition.)

Overall, I like it.



Alex


Forest Simmons said:
> First Question:
>
> Does anybody on this list believe that the following lone mark method is
> inferior to Lone Mark Plurality?
>
> Method:
>
> (1) Each candidate publicly grades all of the other candidates.
>
> (2) Each voter votes for one candidate.
>
> (3) Each candidate casts one Approval ballot for each vote received.
>     These approval ballots must be consistent with part (1).
>
> (4) The candidate with the highest approval total wins the election.
>
>
> Note that the method requires no modification of current ballots or
> equipment.
>
> Note that the method satisfies the Majority Criterion since any
> candidate receiving a majority in part (2) can (and will) win by
> approving only him/herself.
>
> Strategy: you vote for the candidate whose judgment (of the candidates)
> you trust the most.
>
> It seems to me that there hardly any more incentive for the voter to
> vote insincerely than there is in any other method that satisfies the
> Majority Criterion.
>
>
>
> Second Question:
>
> Does anybody on this list believe that this method is inferior to IRV as
> a public proposal?
>
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