[EM] Condorcet Violates Strong FBC

[Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon]

Please explain CRAB....

Forest Simmons a écrit :

> Random ballot does satisfy strong FBC.
>
> I suspect that no majoritarian method absolutely satisfies strong FBC,
> though some methods like the instant version of CRAB (Cumulative Repeated
> Approval Balloting) satisfy it for all practical purposes.
>
> I'll write more when my Internet Service Provider quits acting up.
>
> Forest
>
> On Mon, 4 Nov 2002, Alex Small wrote:
>
> > Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon said:
> > > Alex,
> > > does any method satisfy strong FBC?
> >
> > Good question.  I know that Condorcet methods don't, and monotonic
> > majoritarian methods don't.  Rated methods don't.  If I could show that
> > majoritarian methods don't, irrespective of montonicity, I'd be
> > satisfied.  We know that IRV is non-monotonic but majoritarian, but it
> > doesn't satisfy strong FBC.  Maybe I need different techniques.
> >
> > I started looking at the case where we remove monotonicity.  You have to
> > consider the possibility that favorite betrayal gives the same result as
> > a voter changing his preference from A>B>C to A>C>B.  Then you have a
> > new electorate.  But then you have to look at the new electorate and try
> > to figure out which faction to tinker with.  The number of scenarios to
> > consider grows out of control.  If I can just find a path out of that,
> > one that takes me in a circle to expose a contradiction, I'll be happy.
> >
> > Any thoughts on extending the current results to 4 or more candidates?
> >
> >
> >
> > Alex
> >
> >
> >
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