[EM] Strong FBC Can Be Satisfied By Ranked Methods! (sort of)
Dave Ketchum
davek at clarityconnect.com
Sat Nov 2 21:21:11 PST 2002
On Thu, 31 Oct 2002 21:57:52 -0800 (PST) Alex Small wrote:
> Forest Simmons said:
>
>>Alex, it seems to me that if only the first two ranks get points, then
>>in a close race among several candidates if your favorite isn't among
>>the top three contenders with near equal chances, you may want to give
>>the top to slots on your ballot to your preferred among the top three
>>contenders.
>>
>
>
> This is true in the case of imperfect information. I should make the
> criterion a matter of hindsight:
>
> A method gives incentives for favorite betrayal if there exist situations
> in which a voter prefers an outcome obtained by ranking another candidate
> over his favorite over any and all outcomes that would have been obtained
> by sincerely ranking his favorite in first place.
>
Said another way, giving points to only the first two ranks:
Is fine if I find it convenient to list my favorite first and
least-of-evils second.
Unreasonably favors whatever lemon I place second, if I have only
one candidate to promote.
Unreasonably works against least-of-evils if there are two
candidates I like better and actually place least-of-evils below second.
To clarify: Least-of-evils is the candidate I like best among those with
an expectable chance of winning. I WANT to get in on this decision while
also listing my true favorites up front.
--
davek at clarityconnect.com http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026
Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
If you want peace, work for justice.
----
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list