[EM] 2-step CR: A proposal

Joe Weinstein jweins123 at hotmail.com
Wed May 22 17:33:31 PDT 2002


2-step CR?

Alex’ 2-step CR proposal seems like a generalization of  Majority Choice 
Approval to the case of a higher-res version of CR (Approval = CR with 
resolution=2, i.e. just two available grades).  For that reason I really 
liked it at first.  However, there is a fly in the ointment: a key if subtle 
respect in which the proposal does not accomplish what Majority Choice 
Approval does.

Consider Majority Choice Approval, for the case (which will often occur) 
where no candidate is - or in advance looks like - a majority-favorite.  For 
that case, there is no instrumental difference between top grade 
(‘preferred’ : two checks) and the next marked grade (‘accepted’, one 
check).  Both grades yield  the same degree of instrumental support.  As a 
result, an instrumental strategist need have no regret giving top grade to 
his true favorite, and a lesser grade to his unfavorite but acceptable 
compromise.

That is, as Alex earlier correctly noted and emphasized, Majority Choice 
Approval has the merit of giving little or no incentive toward insincerely 
ranking your lesser-evil compromise equal to your true favorite.

However, under the new 2-step CR proposal, in case there is no majority 
favorite, top grade and next-to-top grade will count differently.  The 
difference may seem small to some, but it will exist and be serious for 
others. If you are serious about optimal instrumentally focused strategy, 
you will still face considerable pressure to insincerely rank compromise 
equal to favorite.

That is, you will face the same old strategist’s quandary that now exists 
with Lone Mark plurality (and is our main reason for seeking election method 
reform):  you can NOT simultaneously address two major voting goals: (1) 
expressively indicate your true favorite as strictly preferred, and (2) give 
maximum instrumental support, when needed, to your acceptable (‘lesser 
evil’) compromise.

The advantage and deep insight of both the original Five-Slot Approval (or 
other X-slot Approval) and the new Majority-Choice Approval schemes is that 
with them you CAN simultaneously address both these goals.

But, compared with Majority Choice Approval, the 2-step CR proposal does 
offer the benefit of extra expressive flexibility.  There is a good way to 
get this benefit while retaining the essential merits of Five (or X) -Slot 
Approval and Majority-Choice Approval.

Namely (for instance), use a Majority Choice version of Five (or X)-slot 
Approval.  That is, if no candidate is a majority favorite - i.e. gets a 
top-grade (A) vote from the majority of voters - then count each of the 
higher votes (A, B or C) as approved, and each of the lower votes (D or F = 
blank) as not approved.

Joe Weinstein
Long Beach CA USA



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