[EM] 1-seat Cumulative isn't FPTP?
MIKE OSSIPOFF
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue May 28 17:51:13 PDT 2002
Don--
I didn't say that Single-winner Cumulative is identical to FPTP.
I said that they're strategically equivalent. Yes, in my subject-line,
I briefly stated my topic by saying "Single-winner Cumulative = FPTP",
but in my message, I made my meaning clear.
A voter maximizes hir utility expectation, in single-winner
Cumulative, if s/he gives all of hir votes to the candidate for whom
s/he'd vote in Plurality.
IRVing is the best solution. It allows every voter to place the full
weight of their vote on one candidate as most voters wish to do, but each
voter can support other candidates by ranking those other candidates. In
the event your first choice is last, you will be asked to change your vote,
your next choice is your change of vote. Voters are allowed to keep
changing their votes until one candidate has a majority.
The lessons to be learned here are as follows:
[...]
* That all voters should have the same weight of voting power
I reply:
All voters have the same voting power in Approval. Any voter has the
power to cancel out any other voter's ballot. All voters have exactly
the same voting options. All voters have the same power. A voter doesn't
gain power by voting for more candidates. How much power is wielded by
the voter who votes for all the candidates in Approval? The voter who
votes for more than one candidate is a voter who's forced to compromise.
What's more powerful about that? No one seriously claims that CR
gives some voters more power than other voters. Approval is a point
system in which we can give to any candidate either 1 or 0 points.
No one has more power than anyone else in the matter of whether or
not Smith will get more votes than Jones.
You continued:
...like
either only one vote each or having the same number of votes to cast anyway
they want.
I reply:
Oh, we've learned the lesson that that's what people want? One
vote, so they can have the dilemma of whether to give it to their
favorite, or to a compromise who might otherwise be eliminated before it
reaches him/her? All we've been shown is that that's whay you
want.
You continue:
* That there should be some way to support other candidates.
I reply:
How well are you supporting Middle, if you vote Favorite 1st, and
Middle 2nd, and Middle gets eliminated before your single traveling
vote reaches Middle?
You continue:
* That the winning candidate should have a majority of the total votes.
I reply:
We've discussed at length the silly IRV definition of majority,
the definition that says that an IRV winner has a majority
if a majority prefer him to one other candidate, when only considering
those two :-)
Mike Ossipoff
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