[EM] Approval Strategy

[Arnold B. Urken]

Quoting Adam Tarr <atarr at purdue.edu>:

> Rob LeGrand wrote:
> 
> >Strategy A: Approve all candidates I prefer to the current CRAB 
> >first-placer; also approve the first-placer if I prefer him to the 
> >second-placer.
> 
> >strategy A always homes in on the Condorcet winner when one exists and all
> 
> >voters use the same strategy.
> 
> This is really an outstanding insight.  A reliable approval strategy that 
> requires knowledge of the polling information rather than estimations of 
> probabilities of victory, and requires ordinal rankings of candidates 
> rather than estimates of candidate utility.
> 
> While this is only assured to work with CRAB balloting and with all voters 
> using the strategy, this strategy seems near-optimal for a standard 
> approval election, and it requires none of the hard-to-come-by estimates of
> 
> some of the slightly more accurate methods.
> 
> -Adam
Please correct me if I am wrong--I have been away from the list for a 
while--but isn't this strategy similar to the finding in the literature that 
says that optimally, approval votes should be cast for each choice that equals 
or exceeds the voter's average utility rating of the candidates?
Arnie
> 
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