[EM] Strong FBC

[Alex Small]

Mike wrote a while back:

>I read that Riker proved that when voters have complete information about
>eachother's preferences, and act to optimize their immediate outcome, the
>sincere CW will win, no matter what (nonprobabilistic?) voting system is
>used.

If this is true then perhaps it is possible to come up with a system
satisfying "strong FBC."

Suppose that we all input our preference orders into a computer.  The
program looks at what we all want, and assigns each of us the best strategy
to optimize our outcome given info on the other voters' preferences.  The
sincere CW will then win after we've all been assigned a strategy that
gives us the best shot at what we want.

In that case, there's no reason to rank anybody equal to favorite, so
strong FBC is satisfied.  The assigned strategy may place somebody equal to
favorite, but the initial input can place favorite as #1.

However, this seems suspect to me.  The issue of cycles comes to mind...

In any case, I would like to know where you found out about this.  Given
Riker's work it may be possible to come up with an existence or
impossibility proof for voting systems that satisfy strong FBC.  Either one
would be important.  And, since there either is or is not a way to satisfy
strong FBC one of those proofs should be possible (is that an existence
proof? ;)


Alex

----
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), 
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em