IRV wins big in SF and Vermont

[Forest Simmons]

Clarifications below:

On Thu, 7 Mar 2002, Forest Simmons wrote:

> A carefully chosen Proxy method would be less vulnerable to compromising
> than IRV, and much simpler for the voter (just mark your favorite on the
> ballot, and trust him/her to cast your vote wisely in the final stage or
> stages of the election).
>
> I don't believe that IRVies would claim that Proxy Approval punishes the
> voter for voting Favorite strictly above Compromise.

To clarify: I mean that IRV supporters might not get the same mental block
about Proxy Approval that they have about standard Approval. My reason for
believing this is that singling out Favorite as proxy is tantamount to
ranking Favorite strictly above Compromise.

> Their main objection would be that some voters would like to designate
> their second and third choices as well, not completely trusting their
> favorite as proxy.

However, for most IRV supporters, ranking the candidates beyond their
first choice is just a necessary nuisance.  They consider it the price
they must pay in order to be able to "safely" vote their favorite first.

> That's my main objection, too, (although I would trust Nader as my proxy
> any day), but that defect doesn't bother me nearly as much as IRV's
> defects. [Whoever wins, favorite or not, will end up as your proxy for
> his/her term of office. Might as well get used to the idea.]

[A democratically elected representative is supposed to be a kind of proxy
for the represented, anyway.]

> As near as I can see, it [i.e. Proxy Approval] beats IRV in every other
> respect,

[i.e. besides the limitation on voter expression]

> not the least of which is simplicity of ballot.
>
> If we are driven (by IRVie mental blocks) to propose a method inferior to
> standard Approval, then let it be a method with a simple ballot, and
> easy to vote,

while clearly beating IRV on its strongest selling point.

For IRV supporters, ranking the candidates beyond their first choice is
either a necessary nuisance (at worst) or frosting on the cake (at best).
I think that most just consider it to be the price they must pay in order
to be able to "safely" vote their favorite first.

That supposed "safety" (to vote Favorite first without spoiling
Compromise's chances in the event of Favorite's failure) is what lured
them away from lone mark plurality to the IRV camp, nine times out of ten.

They should be able to see that Proxy Approval is another, simpler and
better solution to the lesser-evil/spoiler problem that doesn't require
them to rank the candidates.

I'm still not ready to give up on selling standard Approval, but I think
it is good to have some alternatives that directly address IRV psychology
to fall back on.

Any comments or further ideas along these lines?

Forest