[EM] more inputs & more ballotings
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sun Mar 24 19:13:05 PST 2002
Maybe much improvement could be gotten by methods that use more
than one balloting, especially more than 2 ballotings. Maybe
idealness can be approached more if methods additionally use
more than 1 kind of input.
How good could such methods get, in regards to the goal of
reducing strategy incentive or strategy dilemma? Which method of that
type seems the best in that regard?
For 1-balloting, nonprobabilistic methods, is there any method
that can do better than Approval, CR, & Condorcet(wv) when judged
by that standard?
It wouldn't surprise me if a multiballoting, multi-input method
could do significantly better than the best 1-balloting methods.
Condorcet can be improved by holding a 2nd balloting under some
conditions, but Condorcet(wv) is so good as-is that the acceptance
value of just 1 balloting seems to outweigh the benefit of the
I suspect that's true also of the possibly super-better
multiballoting, multi-input methods. Their added complexity would
reduce their public acceptability, and the best simple methods are
already so good that further improvement isn't worth the loss
of public acceptability.
Of course those more complex but better methods would still be useful
for organizations & committees that want the very best social choice
methods. But, for me, the big value in organizations using better
voting systems is that they could set precedent for those methods
being adopted for public elections. With that goal, one would want
to offer organizations methods that would be winnable as public
I'm not saying that the best 1-balloting rank-counts don't leave
obvious room for improvement--I noticed that especially when I
realized that even with the best of those, I'd vote as in
Approval in our public elections, ranking all the acceptable
candidates in 1st place.
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