Saari reply

[Dave Ketchum]

On Sat, 22 Jun 2002 08:45:17 -0700 Bart Ingles wrote:

> 
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> 
>>      While Condorcet's cyclic ambiguities can be a debate topic,
>>hopefully these only occur in near-tie situations, and those who would
>>debate hopefully can be locked in a closet until they can agree on a
>>public position.
>>
> 
> No, sorry, there does not need to be a near-tie in order to have cycles.


MUST be approaching a tie, even if you do not like "near" as an adjective. 
   We know that while A>B and B>C are significant enough for both to head 
for the winner's circle, C>A also MUST have significant backers or we 
could not be cyclic.

> 
> Furthermore, you don't need to anticipate a cycle in order to have
> incentive to truncate or rank insincerely.
> 

How much of a real problem might this be, knowing the reputation for 
honesty that exists among those who give me the "information" I need to 
successfully sway the vote via "insincerity"?

I have trouble thinking how truncation can get me in trouble in Condorcet 
- I have still given positive ranking to all I claim to care about and, 
via truncation, I simply rank all the leftovers as equal at the bottom of 
the barrel.

> 
> 
>>AND, I see explaining Condorcet to voters as reasonably simple:
>>      Think of the candidates in order, starting with your top preference
>>and continuing until you lose interest - and indicate this ordered list on
>>the ballot.
>>      Ignore any troublemaker who talks of spoilers.  Listing your desired
>>minor candidate first will have ZERO effect on what your voting as to the
>>major candidates does (of course, if enough voters show preference for
>>that minor candidate, then that candidate would really be major and
>>possibly win).
>>      Ignore troublemakers who talk of desiring to show the same
>>preference for two or more candidates.  You cannot do this, but are little
>>deprived - ranking two candidates next to each other gives them the same
>>preference relative to all other candidates - which you list first will
>>not matter unless they are tied for winning.
>>
> 
> This sounds like CVD's strategy for promoting IRV -- i.e. lie to the
> voters, telling them that "it is always advantageous to rank candidates
> sincerely", "the spoiler problem is eliminated", etc.


I apologize for not finding more time for EM.  However, I have real trouble 

seeing how the spoiler stays alive, let alone having the strength it has 

with plurality voting.  I ask above about sincerity.

> 
> Granted, the likelihood for needing strategy is less for Condorcet
> (except in certain situations), but it is not eliminated.  The only
> voting system I know of that eliminates strategy is "random ballot" or
> some variant thereof.
> 

Without being certain, "random ballot" sounds like giving up my right to 
express my desires.

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum    108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
              Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                    If you want peace, work for justice.

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