Borda and majority candidates

Richard Moore rmoore4 at
Thu Jan 17 17:29:23 PST 2002

DEMOREP1 at wrote:

> Mr. Ingles wrote-
> When looking at votes-as-cast, it's easy to show how Borda can elect a
> unanimously despised candidate:
>                      Voter rating
>          <---preferred               despised--->
>          ----------------------------------------
>  40      A                                  C D E
>  60      B                                  C D E
> In other words, C, D, and E are all despised candidates.  Even though B
> has a 60% majority, C wins the Borda count with 200 points compared to B
> with 180.
> ----
> D- This is yet another example that later choice votes should NOT be counted 
> if they hurt an earlier choice.

Ah yes, but if the C candidates were closer to the preferred end of the 
then that "later choice" SHOULD be counted.

Which simply makes the case for the argument that Borda is improved by 
In truncated Borda, if a candidate is close to the preferred end of the 
then rank that candidate, if not, then don't include that candidate. 
This gives
the voter the power to decide whether it is worthwhile to allow his 2nd 
or 3rd
choice a chance of hurting his 1st or 2nd choice. If the above voters take
advantage of truncation, then B will be selected.

And of course, the ultimate extension of this argument is to just use 

 -- Richard

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