Borda and majority candidates

[Richard Moore]

DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:

> Mr. Ingles wrote-
> 
> When looking at votes-as-cast, it's easy to show how Borda can elect a
> unanimously despised candidate:
> 
>                      Voter rating
>          <---preferred               despised--->
>          ----------------------------------------
>  40      A                                  C D E
>  60      B                                  C D E
> 
> In other words, C, D, and E are all despised candidates.  Even though B
> has a 60% majority, C wins the Borda count with 200 points compared to B
> with 180.
> ----
> D- This is yet another example that later choice votes should NOT be counted 
> if they hurt an earlier choice.


Ah yes, but if the C candidates were closer to the preferred end of the 
spectrum
then that "later choice" SHOULD be counted.

Which simply makes the case for the argument that Borda is improved by 
truncation.
In truncated Borda, if a candidate is close to the preferred end of the 
spectrum
then rank that candidate, if not, then don't include that candidate. 
This gives
the voter the power to decide whether it is worthwhile to allow his 2nd 
or 3rd
choice a chance of hurting his 1st or 2nd choice. If the above voters take
advantage of truncation, then B will be selected.

And of course, the ultimate extension of this argument is to just use 
Approval.


 -- Richard