[EM] When will Approval Voting defeat a majority candidate
Bart Ingles
bartman at netgate.net
Wed Jan 16 23:12:47 PST 2002
Two points to consider:
(1) When examining actual ballots, if only one candidate has a majority,
that candidate will be the Approval winner. In other words, Approval
Voting cannot fail to elect a first choice majority *as expressed in
actual ballots*.
(2) If concerned about sincere preferences rather than ballots-as-cast,
then any voting system can fail to elect the sincere first choice
majority. A Hare (IRV) example:
Voter acceptability scale (sincere)
100 70 0
------------------------------------------
26% A B C
23% B AC
51% C B A
Assuming the actual percentages are not known in advance, or only
approximately known, then the polls may predict a runoff with A and C in
a dead heat. If so, then the C voters' expected outcome has an expected
utility of only 0.5 with sincere voting. If instead they reverse the
order of their top two choices, they can guarantee that B wins with an
expected utility of 0.7 (assuming the group is cohesive enough to carry
out the strategy). So the actual votes-as-cast will be:
26% A B
23% B
51% B C
(so of course the candidate with a majority of actual votes wins -- the
same as under approval voting). I'm fairly sure you can show the same
with any voting system. This may not be a common situation, but neither
is the Approval equivalent.
Alexander Small wrote:
>
> The fact that Approval Voting can fail to elect somebody who is the first
> choice of a majority is often cited as a defect. The circumstances under
> which this can happen, however, are rare and worth examining, at least in
> a race with 3 candidates: [...]
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