[EM] 12/30/02 - Alex, Irving still holds the Trump Card:
    Adam Tarr 
    atarr at purdue.edu
       
    Mon Dec 30 10:49:06 PST 2002
    
    
  
Alex wrote:
>As to Adam's point that IRV, Approval, and Condorcet all give the same
>result in the case of 2 strong front-runners:
>
>Say we have
>
>40% Left>Center>Right
>11% Center>Left>Right
>  9% Center>Right>Left
>40% Right>Center>Left
>
>IRV selects Left, Condorcet selects Center, and Approval can select any of
>the above depending on the choices of the voters, although Right is the
>least likely outcome.
Absolutely, I agree.  My response was sort of overlooking the "weak center" 
example that is popular on this list.  I was thinking along the lines of a 
more trivial case, such as
10% Libertarian>Republican
39% Republican
37% Democrat
14% Green>Democrat
Assuming reasonably rational voters, approval, Condorcet, IRV, top two 
runoff, Bucklin, MCA, cardinal rankings, et cetera... will all give the 
same result.  Only Borda and Plurality do not, for they still encourage 
swapping your favorite with your second place.
I agree that your example (the standard list example) reveals differences, 
and that these differences favor approval, Condorcet, Bucklin, MCA, and 
cardinal rankings over IRV and top two runoff.  It seems from previous 
posts that Donald and other IRV backers do not really see a distinction 
between the left, center, right example and the one I just gave.  In their 
minds, the center candidate is weak, just like the Green and Libertarian 
candidates I show above.  The fact that your center candidate is preferred 
by a majority over every other candidate just doesn't strike them as 
significant.
-Adam
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