# Yes/No Voting

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Mon Dec 9 14:56:44 PST 2002

```On Mon, 9 Dec 2002, Gervase Lam wrote:

> Each voter may give a candidate "Yes", "No", or nothing. A candidate's
> No votes are subtracted from his Yes votes, and the result is his
> score. The candidate with highest score wins.
>
> That's equivalent to CR, with -1, 0, 1. Which is equivalent to
> 0, 1, 2 CR. Which of course is strategically equivalent to Approval.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
> --
>
> If there were just three candidates, would this be equivalent to Borda?
> Doesn't this make it more susceptible to order reversal than Approval?

No, because standard Borda doesn't allow two candidates to share the top
rank, and in maverick versions that do allow it, the two candidates at the
top have to each be satisfied with the a rank of 1.5 .

>
> Also, how is this strategically equivalent to Approval?  Could you give
> some examples?

Here's one way to see it.  Suppose that several voters believe that the
midrange value is the best value to rate a certain candidate in a certain
CR election.  Then statistically, they can accomplish the same thing by
tossing coins and individually assigning the candidate top or bottom
rating depending on heads or tails, respectively.

>
> Personally I prefer the levels to be scored 1 (Full vote/point), 0.5 (Half
> vote/point) and 0 (No vote/points).  This would probably be easier for the
> voter.
>
> Thanks,
> Gervase.
>
> ----