[EM] MCA in use

Joe Weinstein jweins123 at hotmail.com
Fri Aug 16 15:50:33 PDT 2002

My original (Fri 9 Aug) post stated, "Our process could readily have been 
formalized as an MCA election among candidates A-E.  Under usual Approval, B 
would have won; but in effect we followed MCA, making A the clear winner."

In response, Adam Tarr wrote (Sun 11 Aug):

"I wouldn't be so sure that B would win in approval."

He goes on to explain,

"If everyone took the name "Approval Voting" at face value, and voted for 
all the candidates they considered acceptable, then yes, B would win.  But 
that's usually a poor strategy in Approval ... if the A supporters are even 
mildly strategic, they will vote for only A in an approval election, and A 
will win.  This assumes that people are aware that A and B are the 
front-runners, but for the sound of it this was the case here as well."

Adam's opening point is indisputable.

The followon reasoning is more debatable because not only one faction was 
free to strategize, and moreover information before the voting was far from 
total.  In hindsight, it seems that a minority liked candidate A a lot more 
than candidate B, a larger minority liked candidate B a tad more than 
candidate A, and another 'middle' minority was keen equally for both A and B 
(as versus the other candidates C,D,E).  So A would win a 'sincere' MCA 
vote, B would win a 'sincere' Approval vote, and B would likely win an 
Approval vote which was equally well 'strategized' by all factions.  (Here, 
'strategy' for the respective factions would seem to call for voting for A 
only, for B only, and for both.)

Joe Weinstein
Long Beach CA USA

MSN Photos is the easiest way to share and print your photos: 

For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc), 
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list