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Dave Ketchum davek at clarityconnect.com
Thu Sep 27 00:40:29 PDT 2001

On Wed, 26 Sep 2001 23:39:17 -0700 Richard Moore wrote in part:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
> > On the other side, "Two levels" puzzles me - if I had more time for this
> > group I might have got this from context, but I could have been asking
> > the same question (e.g., this could have been tied to something for
> > which Craig and I cannot picture levels being involved).
> I'm not sure where the difficulty is; it's not a major
> abstraction, but perhaps the term has multiple uses. Buddha
> certainly got it in his post. Approval voting uses a
> two-level ballot: Each candidate can get either a mark
> (approved, or Buddha's "A" level) or no mark (disapproved,
> or Buddha's "B" level).
> Condorcet methods use ballots with N levels when there are N
> candidates. So do IRV, Borda, or any other fully-ranked
> method. Ratings methods use M levels, where M is arbitrary
> (and again, Approval is a special case where M=2).
> If you constrain voters to a two-level ballot, and tabulate
> the results into a pairwise matrix and evaluate the matrix
> with the same method that you would evaluate it in a
> Condorcet method, then you will pick the Approval winner. So
> Condorcet and Approval both can use the same counting
> method, but they use different ballots.

Aha!  Levels seems clear from Condorcet for 10 candidates having 10 levels.

But then you say you can have something in 2 levels that you also call Condorcet.

There are enough words here to see that is what you are saying.  Looking
back to what Craig was quoting on Thu, 27 Sep 2001 08:29:41 +1200, there
were less words, what looks like a contradiction, and I side with Craig
on need for clarification.

Said another way, Condorcet requires the N levels, and you do nothing
but confuse by labeling something else a variation of Condorcet.

Modification:  Some have wanted to allow giving multiple candidates
identical ranks, as in A>B=C where A is preferred, B and C are equally
liked second best, and D and E, assuming such exist, share being liked
less than B and C.  Thus this ballot fits in 3 levels while another
voter might have used all 5 levels in this election.  I see this
particular stretch as both compatible with Condorcet philosophy and
explainable to voters.
> Richard

 davek at clarityconnect.com    http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum    108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
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