[EM] CR style ballots for Ranked Preferences

Jobst Heitzig heitzig at mbox.math.uni-hannover.de
Mon Sep 24 09:34:42 PDT 2001

On Mon, 24 Sep 2001, Anthony Simmons wrote:

> >> However, what I can't see is why this should be of any
> >> importance. Instead, it just shows that in order to
> >> determine the winner, one cannot divide the electorate
> >> into groups but must consider all voters simultaneously!

I would like to emphasize this again: In order to use a rule that has this
presumably negative property of "inconsistency", one only must assure that
the whole electorate is treated simultaneously. For summable rules,
there is no problem in doing so! 

> We have an interesting institution in the U.S., which
> illustrates the importance of arbitrary boundaries:  The
> electoral college.  California gets a certain number of
> electors in the presidential election.  If, as some people
> would like, California were to split into two states, the
> total number of electors for California would be increased by
> two.  Same people, same territory, two more electors.

Right - okay. But doesn't that show that this voting system is quite bad?
Anyway, I don't think the notion of "inconsistency" applies also to voting
systems that elect representatives instead of a single winner. How would
"inconsistent" be defined then? What I was talking about was the situation
where the electorate elects one winner, and I still cannot see why this
decision should take place first in groups rather than at once. 


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