[EM] two bit ratings

Craig Layton craigl at froggy.com.au
Fri Sep 21 15:21:17 PDT 2001


You wrote;

>I think that what you are saying is what we have all been taking for
>granted, and is true 99.9999 percent of the time.
>But consider the possibility that the voters truncate for strategical
>reasons even when they do have significant preferences among the truncated
>candidates, and that the information from the polls might be so far off
>(or the voters so confused on strategy) that the truncation choices were
>unwise enough to eliminate the true CW, or lucky enough to eliminate a low
>utility CW.
>I admit it is extremely unlikely, but if it is possible, then the method
>doesn't technically satisfy the absolute version of the Condorcet
>Am I overlooking something here?

I expect you're right, but isn't the Condorcet Criterion phrased something
like "if there is a sincere Condorcet winner, and all voters vote sincerely,
then the sincere Condorcet winner must win"?  I admit that it doesn't mean
very much if, in practice, the sincere condorcet winner sometimes doesn't
win because people don't vote sincerely, but it does provide a distinction
between Condorcet methods and approval, plurality etc.

The truncation situation you describe cannot be thought of as a sincere
vote, as the voter is making a clear choice to rank the bottom candidates
equally, even though he doesn't believe that they are equal.


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