[EM] IFPP for more than three candidates?

Markus Schulze schulze at sol.physik.TU-Berlin.DE
Mon Sep 17 08:41:24 PDT 2001


Dear Rob,

of course, this IFPP generalization also violates the monotonicity
criterion. When 3 CABD voters are changed to ACBD in your example,
then the winner is changed to C.

Situation 1:

  10:A>B>C>D
  15:B>A>C>D
  23:C>A>B>D

  The quota is 12. A and D are eliminated in the first round, then
  B beats C.

Situation 2:

  10:A>B>C>D
  15:B>A>C>D
  20:C>A>B>D
   3:A>C>B>D

  D is eliminated in the first round. In the second round, the quota
  is 16 so that A and B are eliminated and C wins.

Markus Schulze




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