[EM] IFPP for more than three candidates?
Markus Schulze
schulze at sol.physik.TU-Berlin.DE
Mon Sep 17 08:41:24 PDT 2001
Dear Rob,
of course, this IFPP generalization also violates the monotonicity
criterion. When 3 CABD voters are changed to ACBD in your example,
then the winner is changed to C.
Situation 1:
10:A>B>C>D
15:B>A>C>D
23:C>A>B>D
The quota is 12. A and D are eliminated in the first round, then
B beats C.
Situation 2:
10:A>B>C>D
15:B>A>C>D
20:C>A>B>D
3:A>C>B>D
D is eliminated in the first round. In the second round, the quota
is 16 so that A and B are eliminated and C wins.
Markus Schulze
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