[EM] Topics in Social Choice -- Book

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

D- Folks with some spare time may wish to look at the below.

Anything new and different since 1990 ???
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http://info.greenwood.com/books/0275934/0275934306.html

Topics in Social Choice 
Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy, and Proportional Representation 
By Dan S. Felsenthal 
Praeger Publishers. New York. 1990. 232 pages 
LC 89-23006. ISBN 0-275-93430-6. C3430 $67.00 

Available (Status Information Updated 9/13/2001) 

** Description **

Based on a four year research project investigating voting behavior, 
Topics In Social Choice begins with the well-known premise that 
different voting procedures may lead to different outcomes. The author 
then fills a void in present literature by comparing voting procedures 
in terms of four issues: sophisticated versus sincere voting; 
sophisticated voters and simultaneous versus sequential voting; voter 
efficacy in plurality and approval voting; and the use of normative 
standards to compare outcomes. He proposes both a new model of 
sophisticated voting and normative standards for proportional 
representation procedures. This study addresses both the general reader 
interested in voting issues and the serious student of voting schemes, 
voting behavior, and social choice theory. 

Topics In Social Choice is divided into three parts representing its 
three themes. It addresses theoretical and experimental aspects of 
sophisticated voting; the problem of efficacy and "correct decision"; 
and it concludes with an investigation of fair proportional 
representation. The volume represents the first attempt to address 
sophisticated and yet simultaneous voting. It is also the first to 
subject various voting models to competitive testing and provide a set 
of normative criteria for systems evaluation. 

** Table of Contents **

-- Preface 
-- Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures: 
Theoretical Models and Experimental Evidence 
-- Sophisticated Voting: Orientation and General Approach 
-- Two Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson and Niemi-Frank 
-- The Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting under the 
Plurality and Approval Procedures 
-- The Chairman's Paradox and Its Extensions under Sophisticated 
Plurality and Approval Voting According to Models F and NF 
-- The Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting According to Model F 
under the Plurality and Approval Procedures 
-- Tacit Cooperation in Three-Alternative Noncooperative Voting Games: A 
New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality and Approval 
Procedures 
-- Sincere versus Sophisticated Behavior Under PV and AV: A Competitive 
Test of Four Models 
-- Efficacy and "Correct Decisions" 
-- Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality and Approval 
Procedures 
-- Is Cumulative Voting Really Different from Plurality Voting? 
-- On Combining Approval with Disapproval Voting 
-- Majority Rule, "Correct Decisions," and the Quorum Paradox 
-- Proportional Representation: Normative Schemes and an Empirical 
Evaluation of Voting Procedures 
-- Microcosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for Seat Allocation in 
Proportional Representation Systems 
-- Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of the Plurality 
and Approval Procedures 
-- Appendix A: Possible Size Relations Among Four Blocs 
-- Appendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6 
-- Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2 
-- Bibliography 
-- Author Index 
-- Subject Index 

** Author **

DAN S. FELSENTHAL is Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the 
University of Haifa, Israel. 

Greenwood Publishing Group, 88 Post Road West, Westport CT 06881, (203) 
226-3571