[EM] Hybrid Beats-All/Approval v. Straight Approval

Bart Ingles bartman at netgate.net
Mon Oct 29 21:01:17 PST 2001

Forest Simmons wrote:
> If voter X is almost sure that his ballot will make the difference between
> a hated (by X) Condorcet Winner and a Condorcet tie (to be settled by
> chance), voter X might be tempted to deliver up the election to chance
> even if that required him to vote his favorite last and his most despised
> first.
> Of course, if all like minded voters gave in to the same temptation, the
> tie breaker odds of favorite to most despised would be adversely affected.

But if the aim is to sabotage the Condorcet candidate, the insincere
voters would be more likely to manipulate lower preferences, leaving the
first choice intact.  So the random tie breaker would be unaffected (I

If the strategic aim is to help the Condorcet candidate using insincere
strategy, and the voters rank the likely Condorcet candidate equal or
higher than their sincere favorite, then this would of course affect the
random tiebreaker.  This may not be a concern, though, since the
motivation in this case is to prevent the tiebreaker from being used in
the first place.

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