[EM] Re: Consistency, Truncation, etc. (was CR ballots, etc.)

DEMOREP1 at aol.com DEMOREP1 at aol.com
Sun Oct 7 07:34:06 PDT 2001

> fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote in part -
> What are the counter-intuitive results of Approval?
> ----
> D- A *real* first choice can lose (if rankings were being used).
> 48 A
> 3   AC
> 1   BC
> 48 C
> 100
> Approval
> A 51 (all *real* first choice votes)
> B 1
> C 52 (wins using simple Approval) (very unlikely but it can happen)

bartman at netgate.net wrote-

But you don't show why the AC voters would WANT to vote this way. 
Assuming the three voters prefer A to C, your example above is
equivalent to a ranked example where the same three rank A and C equal
in first place, for unknown reasons, and with the same result.

48 A    >  B=C
 3 A=C  >  B
 1 B=C  >  A
48 C    >  A=B

If the voters under either Approval or Condorcet wish to vote this way,
perhaps because they perceive B or some other unlisted candidate as more
of a threat, then I have no problem with this.  It's up to the
individual voters to weight the costs and benefits of any voting
D--  Please again note the *(if rankings were being used)* language which 
means that Approval is NOT being used but that the votes are

> 48 A > [B=C]
> 3   A > C > [B]
> 1   B > C > [A}
> 48 C > [A=B]


I still see 51 A in first place (regardless of the *utility* of any A, B or C 
votes on a plus 100 percent to minus 100 percent *absolute* scale).

As usual I note that the ballots do not say if the voters are being sincere 
or insincere (is that a requirement ??).

If rankings (1, 2, etc.) ONLY are being used due to a lack of high tech 
computer voting (i.e. NO head to head math), then if NO choice has a first 
choice majority, then yet another *simple* tiebreaker would be to do a 
*musical chairs* elimination --- the choice with the most last place votes 
repeatedly loses --- an opposite variant of IRV.

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list