[EM] IRV vs Plurality Vote with a Runoff

[Bart Ingles]

One way to reduce the likelihood of a runoff election while keeping
conventional elections is to adopt the 40% rule used in New York City's
mayoral primaries:
  http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/nm/20011010/pl/politics_newyork_dc_2.html

In NYC the top candidate only needs 40% of the vote to avoid a runoff. 
Makes sense to me, since 40% is no more arbitrary than 50%.  I would
gladly accept a strong plurality over a manufactured majority.

Bart




Anthony Simmons wrote:
> 
> >> From: barnes992001 at yahoo.com
> >> Subject: [EM] IRV vs Plurality Vote with a Runoff
> 
> >>         Does the fact that IRV uses a preference ballot,
> >> instead of a repeated ballot, make it less manipulatable?
> 
> >> Whatever you believe the answer is, can you prove it by
> >> example or argument?
> 
> Well, about a year ago, maybe a little less, there was an
> election in Queensland, Australia, for state legislators.
> One party, One Nation, wanted another party, the Liberals, to
> swap preferences (you recommend that your voters put us down
> as second preference and we will do the same for you).  The
> Libs refused.  In response, One Nation withheld their
> preferences from the Libs.  I don't know how much effect that
> had, but in Queensland, the Liberals are now the Ghosts of
> Elections Past.  As I recall, they didn't even get enough
> votes to remain an official party in Queensland.
> 
> Anyway, I can see how preference swapping would work
> differently in two-round runoff than in IRV.  You can indeed
> swap preferences in two-round runoff, but it only makes sense
> after the first round, while IRV requires parties to make
> their recommendations before the first round.