IRV inconsistency

[Forest Simmons]

Markus doesn't consider Approval Condorcet Maximum Approval (ACMA) to be a
true Condorcet method because it requires more information than the other
Condorcet methods do, namely the Yes/No approval information or the
ranking of an (extra) virtual reference candidate MAC (Minimum Acceptable
Candidate).

Forest

On Wed, 16 May 2001 DEMOREP1 at aol.com wrote:

> Mr. Schulze wrote--
> 
> here is an example that shows that the Condorcet criterion
> and the consistency criterion are incompatible.
> 
>    40 voters vote A > B > C.
>    35 voters vote B > C > A.
>    25 voters vote C > A > B.
> 
> Case 1: Suppose that candidate A is elected. Then when you add
> 51 A > C > B voters and 49 C > B > A voters, the winner is
> changed to candidate C.
> 
> Case 2: Suppose that candidate B is elected. Then when you add
> 51 B > A > C voters and 49 A > C > B voters, the winner is
> changed to candidate A.
> 
> Case 3: Suppose that candidate C is elected. Then when you add
> 51 C > B > A voters and 49 B > A > C voters, the winner is
> changed to candidate B.
> ---
> D-- Who, if anybody, gets 51 YES votes in the 100 voters group or 101 YES 
> votes in the 200 voters group ???
> 
>