[EM] Condorcet cyclic drop rule

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

>Okay, I think this is the correct example to show that defeat support
>punishes truncated votes, and, in fact, any voter who votes two candidates
>equally.

>It doesn't seem to make sense that the 22 voters voting B and C equally
>return a different result than if 11 of them voted B over C and 11 voted C
>over B.  This is what I meant when I said that defeat support behaves
>erratically.  Note that it will always be the best strategy in defeat
>support not to tie any candidates or truncate, encouraging you to vote
>insincerely every time you do not have a preference between two candidates.

There's one thing we can both agree on: This shows the great advantage
of Approval: There's only 1 way to count Approval ballots: Add them up.

Reform advocates (if you can include IRVies among reform advocates)
differ drastically on how to count rank ballots. This discussion shows
that even advocates of similar-sounding pairwise-count methods differ
greatly on which is better. To me, even the best margins pairwise-count
methods bring nothing but Smith Criterion compliance and, in some cases
ICC compliance. Because they don't bring any of the strategy advantages
of the defeat-support methods, I claim that the margins methods don't
deserve to be considered. You (Craig) believe oppositely, because you
are going by some other standard(s) than the lesser-of-2-evils problem
that I consider important, and majority rule. So, as I said, this
dramatically points out the advantage of Approval over whichever rank
method you like best.

I'll reply on the details of your message later, probably tomorrow.

Mike Ossipoff




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