[EM] Majority? Expressivity? Strategy?

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Joe wrote:

>
>STRATEGY?
>
>The most sophisticated argument given in these postings against higher-res
>grading [at least as v. Approval = two-level grading] is that of so-called
>'strategic collapse':  'strategically', a higher-res method allegedly calls
>simply for voting as one might in Approval, i.e. giving every candidate
>either full pass or full fail.
>
>But 'strategy' is being thus used in a very narrow sense: one's vote 
>helping
>determine the winner. In fact probability of - and consequent expected
>utility from - such an effect is usually next to vanishing.

The current election results, and conversations with voters make
it quite clear which is more important to most voters, including
progressives who prefer Nader: Vote to maximize the exptected utility
of the winner. Voters with that goal are called "instrumental voters".
Optimizing the immediate outcome, the winner, is what's important to
nearly all voters. Very few are willing to use their vote sincerely
to send a message. I vote sincerely in Plurality, but very few people do.
In fact, if we had two honest progressives, and my less preferred of
those was more winnable, _I'd_ vote strategically, as nearly everyone else
already does.

I agree with you that voting sincerely makes more sense. But what makes
more sense and what everyone wants to do are 2 different things.

>The probability of casting a decisive vote may be extremely low; but every
>vote (with a properly responsive scoring and reporting system) helps send a
>message for future politics to consider.  Many voters, when they think 
>about
>it (possibly after being reminded of the probabilities) will maximize their
>vote's utility (or 'waste' it least) by trying to maximize the vote's
>message-impact;

But remember that the large number of voters affects your vote's
message-impact too: Your individual vote for Nader didn't make the
slightest difference in how impressive Nader's national total was.
One vote more makes no difference in a national election.

Sure, I prefer sincere voting too, but I'm just saying that the
gains from strategic and sincere voting are both small due to the
large number of voters. The difference is that sincere voting confers
a very real benefit: You can tell people that you voted sincerely and
honestly and didn't have to hold your nose while you voted (and afterwards 
until you bathe?) You can tell them that if everyone sincerely, as you do, 
we'd have a very different country.

Other voters will perceive highest utility in
>being
>able to say to history that they voted as precisely as possible in accord
>with their feelings or conscience.

Yes, that's what I mean. It's what I consider important. But if we're
talking about how most people vote, that isn't how they vote.

>
>When Forest et al confessed that last November they voted their 
>'conscience'
>or 'sincerely' - as if the opposite of 'strategically'

Honesty is hardly something to "confess".

>True strategy will often coincide with - and anyhow NEED NOT be the 
>opposite
>of - expression of conscience or sincerity.  For each voter, it all depends
>on what values and prospects most animate and impact that voter's utility.

But, as I said, we know that is with mosts voters.

>
>Some EM-list members urge methods which limit voter expression: in order,
>benignly, to help protect the voters from impulses to supposedly bad
>behavior, e.g. excursions from supposedly rational strategy.  Well, such
>protection is well served by staying with lone-mark.

Now you're going way to far, Joe. Explain why you believe that Approval
or Condorcet will cause excursions from rational strategy, compared
to Plurality. Approval & Condorcet reduce the need for drastic
insincere strategy, favorite-dumping giveaway strategy.

>I see little point in
>going to the trouble of advocating other methods which will still 
>needlessly
>limit voter power to express preferences. (I also do not see the point of
>scoring methods - e.g. Condorcet - which do not systematically reflect the
>social-utility results of voter expression; but I leave more on that issue
>for another time.)

In all the simulation studies that I've heard of, pairwise-count
methods do excellently in terms of average social utility. Their
score is beaten only by Borda, but Borda is unsuitable for political
elections for reasons that we've discussed here.

I like CR. It's like Approval. When I say that Condorcet & Approval
are the best methods, I mean Condorcet, Approval, & CR are the best methods.

That's the order in which I prefer those 3 methods. The reason I
rank CR below Approval is because CR gets its merit from the degree to
which it's like Approval. Where it differs from Approval, it can
lose some merit. No matter how you personally vote, say that the people
who agree with you about the candidates vote sincerely in CR, and say
that the people whose candidate choices you despise vote strategically
in CR. That's very disadvantageous to you. You'd be much better off with
Approval in that situation. That's why I prefer Approval to CR.

>
>I see every reason to favor feasible and sufficiently simple but highly
>expressive balloting procedures, used with reasonably transparent scoring:
>e.g. high-res grading.

For me, the choice between proposing Condorcet, Approval, or CR
is purely a matter of winnability. Their differences in merit are
insignificant, as far as I'm concerned.

Each one of those 3 methods has arguments for it, with regard to
winnability. CR has the advantage of being much more familiar and
poplular with most people than Approval or Condorcet. That's a very
big advantage.

Approval's easy implementation and the fact that it's such a minimal
change from Plurality rather than a completely new voting system count
in Approval's favor, with regard to winnability.

Many who want voting system reform want rank balloting. Lots of people
mistakenly prefer IRV to Approval because of a predudice for rank balloting. 
To those people, a better rank method might be the best
approach. Though Condorcet doesn't bring a significant merit
improvement over Approval, my limited experience in talking to people
suggests that ranking is more likely to generate enthusiasm when suggested
to people. The down side: They think you're proposing Borda or IRV.
So then it's the battle of trying to get a good rank-count adopted.
Much more difficult when IRVies run the show.

In the previous 3 paragraphs I've stated the case for CR, Approval,
and Condorcet, as I judge their winnability. As I said, winnability is,
for me, the only important consideration for choosing among those 3.
I don't know which one would be the best public proposal.

Mike Ossipoff

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