[EM] Demorep & Approval

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Responding as usual to Mr. Ossipoff---

Approval has the elementary defect of permitting a *real* first choice 
majority winner to lose (if *real* rankings were being used) ---

Sincere

51 A (100) B (99)
 3   B (100)
46 C (100)

100

B wins (54) using simple Approval even though A has a *real* first choice 
majority.

Even with such rather elementary defect Approval is OK for executive and 
judicial office elections -- the most popular candidate(s) would be elected 
to such offices.

Thus Approval might be deemed a transition method under Condorcet utopia 
arrives -- though I note that almost any p.r. method for legislative body 
electiions will use rankings so that rankings will come shortly for executive 
and judicial office elections also.