[EM] Spoilers

[Tony Simmons]

>> Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2001 23:52:28 +0100
>> From: Martin Harper <mcnh2 at cam.ac.uk>
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Spoilers

>> Tony Simmons wrote:

>> >>> From: Martin Harper <mcnh2 at cam.ac.uk>
>> >>> Subject: Re: [EM] Spoilers
>> >>
>> >>> Just what exactly is "sincere approval" in
>> >>> this case? How do I measure it? {genuine
>> >>> question: I don't want to guess from what
>> >>> you've written}
>> >>
>> >
>> > I just mean that the election method is Approval,
>> > and the voters are writing on the ballot what
>> > they actually think of the candidates.

>> So, you might say that some voter has "sincere
>> approval" of some candidate when, in a poll,
>> they truthfully reply to the question "do you
>> approve of Fred?" with the answer "yes"?

That's pretty much what I meant.  Of course, an
election isn't a survey, so the rules of
engagement aren't the same.

>> Problem is, it's entirely possible to find
>> yourself in an election where you  "sincerely
>> approve" of all (or, more likely, none) of the
>> candidates - it's not clear to me that we
>> should disenfranchise such voters by requiring
>> that the candidate with the most "sincere
>> approval" should win. In general, while I
>> agree that "sincere approval" is related to
>> being the best person to elect, I don't think
>> it is exactly the same.

Good point.  Of course the participants aren't
just providing information; they're trying to
accomplish something.  I didn't mean to suggest
that voters are somehow being dishonest if they
don't vote sincerely, just that it complicates
their job if they have to do something more than
say what they want, and since the only competence
requirement for being an elector is eighteen
years' experience breathing ...

>> >>>> Doesn't this sound a lot like the way Plurality
>> >>>> and IRV suppress support for a third party by
>> >>>> forcing voters to be insincere?
>> >>>
>> >>> Approval does suppress support for an
>> >>> *apparent* third party. Plurality and IRV do
>> >>> this too - but they both also suppress support
>> >>> for *genuine* third parties as well. Approval
>> >>> won't do this. In addition Approval only
>> >>> forces voters to be strategic, not insincere,
>> >>> which is "nicer" in some way.
>> >>
>> > How is a third party apparent but not genuine?

>> I meant that it is apparently third, not
>> apparently a party... ;-)

Oops!  <having a good laugh at myself--I actually
did misunderstand>

>> For example, if (flight of fantasy time) Nader
>> had had unanimous first choice support, but
>> the international capitalist conspiracy
>> suppressed this information and made him
>> appear to have only 10% first place support in
>> the polls, then he would be an apparent third
>> party. In an approval election being
>> apparently third would suppress the quantity
>> of approval he got.

That's what I was thinking with the (purely
fictitious) Goofy-Mickey-Roadrunner example.

>> In your example, Road Runner was an apparent
>> third party, (and Mickey voters voted
>> accordingly), but (in the measure of "sincere
>> approval") was actually a frontrunner. In
>> practice, in large elections, polls are good
>> enough to make apparent third parties very
>> rare.

What about when the numbers are so close to the
transition from apparent third to real third that
the polls can't distinguish?  It sounds like that
would be the time when stratetic voting would be
most likely to produce a funny result.

Oh, and Mike, if you've gotten down this far, I
really appreciated what you wrote about the
subject, but I'm not responding because there was
so much material.