[EM] Spoilers

Tony Simmons asimmons at krl.org
Sun Mar 25 10:36:37 PST 2001


>> From: Martin Harper <mcnh2 at cam.ac.uk>
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Spoilers

>> Anthony Simmons wrote:

>> > On the other hand, Mickey voters think that if
>> > support for Goofy is so strong that he beats
>> > Mickey, then for sure he will beat Roadrunner
>> > too.  Thus, they figure that they shouldn't vote
>> > for Roadrunner, since that could build up support
>> > for Roadrunner to the point where, if Goofy
>> > doesn't win after all, the election could go to
>> > Roadrunner.
>
>> > The end result is that Mickey's perceived
>> > advantage over Roadrunner might get him elected
>> > even though Roadrunner might actually have more
>> > sincere approval than Mickey.

>> Just what exactly is "sincere approval" in
>> this case? How do I measure it? {genuine
>> question: I don't want to guess from what
>> you've written}

I just mean that the election method is Approval,
and the voters are writing on the ballot what
they actually think of the candidates.

>> > Doesn't this sound a lot like the way Plurality
>> > and IRV suppress support for a third party by
>> > forcing voters to be insincere?

>> Approval does suppress support for an
>> *apparent* third party. Plurality and IRV do
>> this too - but they both also suppress support
>> for *genuine* third parties as well. Approval
>> won't do this. In addition Approval only
>> forces voters to be strategic, not insincere,
>> which is "nicer" in some way.

How is a third party apparent but not genuine?

I take it "insincere" means ranking or otherwise
evaluating candidates in a way that reverses what
the voter actually believes?  (just checking to
be sure I know the difference between insincere
and strategic).



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