[EM] Unranked-IRV

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Fri Mar 23 20:32:36 PST 2001



>I would like to share perhaps the simplest majority-empowered reform over
>our current election problems.
>
>I'll call this system: Unranked-IRV. It works like IRV but doesn't allow
>voters to rank preferences, only list them like approval, however unlike
>approval votes are divided so each voter only gets one total vote among all
>choices.

When you give the voter a fixed amount of vote, and let him divide
it among the candidates, that's "single-winner Cumulative", a method
that's known to be strategically equivalent to Plurality--one should
give one's whole vote supply to the candidate for whom one would vote
if it were a Plurality election.

When the lowest votegetter is eliminated your vote fraction on him
is divided among the others for whom you've voted?

It might very well be as good as IRV with equal rankings and
divisible one vote, or maybe better, and so it might meet WDSC,
but almost surely will violate FBC & SFC.

It's an IRV mitigation compromise. But the IRV promoters have never
accepted any mitigation compromise, apparently wanting to impose all
of IRV's worst on the voting public. I suggest not bothering with
IRV mitigation compromises. I suggest advocating what seems best,
without regard to what you think the IRV promoters might like.
I suggest Approval & Condorcet.


>Now from my analysis of my sample month election I discover somewhat
>surprisingly that the IRV process can be run entirely on split-vote 
>approval
>ballots! I've known this for a while actually, but I didn't think about the
>value of this.
>
>The value is that we don't need those confusing rankings! Instant runoff
>rounds have votes change between rounds merely from being split among less
>candidates. As candidates are eliminated, support rises for those that
>remain.
>
>Well, is this reform enough to help us? How would this work in a real
>election?

It's surely better than IRV, probably better than IRV with equal rankings
and one divisible vote, and very unlikely to be as good as ordinary
Approval, in terms of criteria, strategy need, stability, etc.

>I judge that Unranked-IRV is the simplest reform (closest to existing
>system) than can handle the difficulties in our current elections.

Oh no, Approval is the simplest method that avoids those problems.
Almost surely Approval does it better than that or any modification
of Approval or compromise between Approval & IRV.

In voting systems, hybridization rarely brings improvement.

I'd call that proposal Cumulative With Eliminations". I've expressed
an initial opinion that it probably won't be as good as Approval, but
it's a method that hadn't occurred to me, and absolutely certain
statements shouldn't be made this soon.

Mike Ossipoff


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