[EM] Bad Condorcet winners?

[Tom Ruen]

Thanks Mike,

Let me repeat my issue simply one last time, just to be brief, not because I
think we have any disagreement.

My concern over compromises exist because preference is often a
multidimensional issue. I simply don't want people to blindly vote in a line
through a 1-dimensional political spectrum when if they thought harder there
may be other criteria that is important in their decision, like experience
and trust-worthiness. I don't want voters to think after they voted that,
maybe their preference would have been a little different with more thought.

I would tell voters, "if you rank beyond your favorite(s), rank thoughtfully
or stop ranking."

This has nothing to do with strategic voting, or insincere voting, only a
concern for negligence. Condorcet most seriously considers lower
preferences, therefore voters have more responsibility to express lower
preferences more accurately.

Plurality doesn't care at all about lower preferences. IRV care some.
Condorcet cares greatly.

If most voters are cautious, a scummy middle won't win simply because there
are two equal factions on both sides of him. This case and others like it
may be very uncommon, but I've heard fear over it, and this is my reply to
that fear - "Vote thoughtful please!"

With this caveat to voters, I am happy to endorse Condorcet as the best
method to express majority voter preference.

Tom Ruen

----- Original Message -----
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
To: <election-methods-list at eskimo.com>
Sent: Sunday, March 18, 2001 8:50 PM
Subject: Re: [EM] Bad Condorcet winners?


>
>
> >Mike, there are 2 ways to look at this. I chose the first, and you the
> >second...
> >
> >The question we're considering is "Which is simpler for voters to rank -
> >IRV
> >or Condorcet?"
> >
> >1. IRV is less demanding because it never uses lower rankings on a ballot
> >until all higher candidates are eliminated. Therefore voters don't have
to
> >think very hard about lower choices.
>
> They'll find that they have to think about whether to rank a lower choice
in
> 1st place, over their favorite.
>
> >However when an election is a close
> >3-way contest, there is the dilemma on whether to compromise first to be
> >safe against a strong scary candidate.
>
> That "however" contradicts your statement that voters don't have to
> be concerned about lower choices. You seem to be saying that those
> lucky voters don't have to worry about whether or not to help a 2nd
> choice, because their vote for a 2nd choice might not be counted.
> But if the voter wants to protect that 2nd choice, then that's a problem
> to that voter. And if the voter doesn't want to help his 2nd choice?
> Then in Condorcet, no one's forcing you to rank your 2nd choice.
> Condorcet gives you the choice. IRV might take that choice away from
> you,  by ignoring your Middle>Worst preference vote, unless you
> make the drastic decision of voting Middle in 1st place, over Favorite.
>
> >
> >2. Condorcet is less demanding because voters never need to vote
> >insincerely
> >to get what they want. There is no spoiler candidate. Condorcet gives
> >majority rule power in all dimensions. However this added power of ranks
> >means voters must consider more.
>
> Freedom from strategy means that they have less need to consider.
> What do you claim they need to consider? Not strategy.
>
> >
> >What I am concerned about is whether in the end voters really WANT what
> >they
> >GET out of Condorcet.
>
> If a Nader voter doesn't want to help Gore, then he needn't rank Gore.
> I sure wouldn't ever rank a Democrat in Condorcet, or vote for one
> in any voting system. Condorcet doesn't prevent me from refusing to
> rank a "middle" candidate whom I don't like and who I believe doesn't
> deserve any vote from me.
>
> But if you're one of those millions who preferred Nader and insisted
> on helping Gore to defeat Bush, then Condorcet would let you do so
> without insincere voting. That isn't true with IRV.
>
>
> >
> >I'm NOT worried about telling the person who is already offering a
> >compromise vote (in Plurality) because they're afraid their favorite
can't
> >win. Those are the voters that will most benefit from approval or
rankings.
>
> You got that right. But we'll all benefit when they aren't forced
> to falsify their preferences as Plurality & often IRV force them to do.
>
> >
> >I am worried that people who already are happy with a favorite in
plurality
> >who may somewhat thoughtlessly vote for a compromise in Condorcet simply
> >for
> >being a compromise.
>
> It isn't for you or me to judge the validity of other votes' thoughts.
> If they rank their 2nd choice it's because they feel there's a possibility
> that they might need to defeat someone worse thereby.
> Or maybe they just want to express, to the rest of the population,
> their 2nd choice. So what? What's the problem?
>
> >
> >If a voter looks at an election and sees 3 choices - Favorite,
Compromise,
> >and Opposite, I don't want voters to quickly rank "1.F 2.C 3.O" blindly
> >because it seems "logical". I want voters to say, "After my favorite, who
> >do
> >I really think will make a better leader - Compromise or Opposite?" If,
> >after serious thought, the voter says, "Yes, I would certainly rather
have
> >Compromise over Opposite", then I'm fully content.
>
> Yes, that's why we call Compromise his 2nd choice--because he prefers
> Compromise to Opposite.
>
> >
> >However I expect in some cases voters will vote Opposite over Compromise.
>
> Why do that in Condorcet? As an attempt at a risky offensive
> strategy? That will be vanishingly rare in public elections.
> Why would you vote someone whom you like less over someone whom you
> like more?
>
> >And I expect some voters to say "If this is my choice, I support
neither."
> >And that is a choice too and it means don't rank either!
>
> Yes, but how is that a problem?
>
> >
> >This is a new responsibility voters have never had to consider before.
>
> Wrong. Refusing on principle to vote for a Democrat isn't unusual now.
> What would be different is that one wouldn't have to choose between
> reliably voting Favorite over Middle & Worst, vs reliably voting
> Middle over Worst.
>
> And why are you so worried about the principled voter who refuses to
> vote for a sleazy compromise? He wouldn't vote for him with Condorcet,
> Approval, IRV, or Plurality. Why are you calling it a Condorcet problem?
>
> >For
> >those that don't choose to think in detail about all those choices, my
> >claim
> >is they (and we all) are better off if they don't rank below their
favorite
> >or favorites.
>
> If they know their preference order, then it doesn't take a lot
> of deliberation to rank sincerely. It will usually be the easiest way
> to vote, especially in public political elections.
>
> You seem to be saying that someone will do harm to himself or society
> if he votes his 2nd choice over his last choice. Would I like them
> to be principled and refuse to rank the Democrat? Sure. But if they're
> principled, then they'll be principled no matter what the voting
> system. What does that have to do with the comparison between Condorcet
> & IRV?
>
> >
> >My concern is that compromise candidates are the ones who have the most
to
> >gain by such negligent voting.
>
> Compromise candidates have the most to gain by the ranking of
> compromises. So what? And who are you to say it's negligent for someone
> to vote his 2nd choice over his last choice if there's some chance
> that his 2nd choice is needed to defeat his last choice?
>
> Sure you're  right when you say that there's a certain kind of sleazes
> who gain by people's need for compromise. Especially under the present
> system. But with Condorcet, the people who tell me they have to hold their
> nose to vote Democrat will vote Nader over the Democrat, even
> when holding their nose and ranking the Democrat.
>
> But it isn't negligent to rank someone whom one feels that one might
> need to beat someone worse. Maybe not very principled, in some cases,
> but not negligent. I'd say you're presuming to judge other votes too
> much.
>
> The example: AC=49, BC=48, CB=3. This is an
> >extreme example, but it forms the basis of my analysis. I'm willing to
> >accept victory for a weakly-top-ranked candidate like C ASSUMING voters
> >were
> >thoughtful and want this compromise.
>
> Why else do you think they ranked him over their last choice?
> Instead of judging their thoughtfulness, accept their expressed
preference.
>
> >
> >This is the entire basis of my concern. Bullet voting has a certain
degree
> >of power and voters are used to that. Voters who want more power can take
> >it
> >in Condorcet. I just want this power used wisely.
>
> An advantage of Condorcet is that simple sincere ranking is wise.
> Principled truncation is often better, but sincere ranking
> is perfectly ok.
>
>
> >
> >I am being protective of voters. I would rather they be conservative.
>
> Suppoe we leave that up to them.
>
> >If
> >asked between two undesirable choices, sometimes it is better to just not
> >answer if you're unsure. If they would not compromise in Plurality, no
> >clear
> >need to start in Condorcet.
>
> That's nonsense. Compromising in Plurality means voting Middle over
> Favorite, and completely dumping Favorite. Someone who wouldn't do
> that might still rank Middle 2nd in Condorcet. I wouldn't, if Middle
> is a Democrat, but many would, and that's up to them, and it's valid
> strategy, given their evaluations of the candidates--something that
> isn't up to you or me.
>
> >
> >That's my approach and that's my defense for Condorcet. Condorcet gives
new
> >power (more power than IRV), but doesn't require people take that power.
> >That's good!
>
> Alright--I have no disagreement with defense of Condorcet or Approval.
>
>
> >
> >Tom Ruen
> >
> > >
> > > >
> > > >These dilemmas show where Condorcet is more demanding on voters than
> >IRV.
> > > >IRV will never look at second choices for voters of A and C.
> > >
> > > What? How does that make IRV less demanding? When IRV ignores your
> > > preference for Gore over Bush, because you sincerely voted Nader
> > > 1st, and your Gore>Bush vote never gets counted because your traveling
> >vote
> > > hadn't reached Gore in time to save him from elimination--how do you
> >call
> > > that less demanding?
> > >
> > > Tom, you IRVies have it backwards. It's because you don't listen.
> > > So I'm going to explain it to you again.
> >
> >
> > >
> > > The whole purpose of rank balloting is so that you can help a
> >compromise.
> > > You or I may have no respect for that compromise, and
> > > no intention of helping him. Irrelevant. Most people desperately need
> > > to help the compromise. In case they might need him, it's important
> > > to them to help him against a greater evil.
> > >
> > > Condorcet automatically lets the lesser-of-2-evils progressive fully
> > > protect Gore against Bush, fully oppose Bush, without any insincere
> > > voting. And that's what you call more demanding. IRV will often make
> > > it necessary for that voter to insincerely rank Gore in 1st place,
over
> > > Nader, in order to keep Bush from winnning. And that's what you call
> > > less demanding.
> > >
> > > >
> > > >I believe in Condorcet process only given voter think well about
lower
> > > >choices
> > >
> > > If people don't care about their lesser choices, then no one,
> > > including you IRVies, has reason to propose rank balloting.
> > >
> > > We need Condorcet or Approval partly because so many progressive
voters
> > > who dislike the Democrats  "think well" enough about them to dump
> > > their favorite in order to help the Democrat, just as they'll often
> > > have to with IRV.
> > >
> > > , or bullet vote if they're unsure what they really want. I'd rather
> > > >voters be conservative than vote haphazardly on lower ranks.
> > >
> > > When progressives vote conservatively & cautiously, they help a
> > > lesser-evil, at any cost to their favorite. I don't know what you
> > > mean by "vote haphazardly". Rank sincerely?
> > >
> > >
> > > >Ranking many
> > > >choices sincerely is a great responsibility!
> > >
> > > Nonsense. Sincere ranking is the easiest and least demanding form
> > > of voting. That's the advantage of Condorcet. Condorcet is the method
> > > that, under plausible conditions, is free of need for strategy.
> > >
> > > You want responsibility? Be the person who calculates strategy for
IRV.
> > > I don't know that anyone has waded into that problem yet. It would
> > > be horrendously complicated.
> > >
> > > Mike Ossipoff
> > >
> > >
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