[EM] Few-voters strategy approaches?

[Richard Moore]

MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:

> In Approval,
> a voter is just as likely to vote A over B as B over A.

Yes, given no other information about the voter.

> And isn't a voter equally likely to vote A & B the same as vote them
> different?

Not so sure about this. For the few voters case, if the voters use some
formula other than simple above-the-mean strategy (which is what we
want to derive), then it may depend on the number of candidates. For
three candidates, evenly distributed in utility, a voter will most likely
vote either A only, B only, or C only. Let's say that turns out to be
very likely. Then bullet voting for one of A or B is more likely than
bullet voting for C. And bullet voting for C is the only bullet vote that
votes A and B equally.

> And isn't he just as likely to vote them the same by
> voting for both as vote them the same by voting for neither?

As in my response to the previous question, it looks as though he's more
likely to vote neither A nor B if he votes them both the same way.

 -- Richard