[EM] Comments--few voters, 0-info

[Tom Ruen]

Mike,

I can't say I follow much of this. I don't know what above-mean strategy is
exactly.

My purpose in having runoffs is to encourage voters to offer as many
approvals as they can. I'm not convinced my only holding a runoff if more
than one candidate exceeds 50%, since it can still reward a compromise
candidate accidentally, even if a majority would prefer another.

If we can have many rounds, I see two forced elimination approaches:
1. Eliminate half (rounded down) candidates each round. Log2(N) rounds.
2. Eliminate 1 candidate each round.

These two methods are the same for 3 or less candidates. I tend to think the
first form is enough since candidates are not really competing directly for
votes.

Thinking about strategy, imagine there are 3 candidates, one will be
eliminated. A and B can be opposites and balanced support, and C is a fair
but weak centrist.

If I support A and I see A and B are pretty equal, I realize that if B gets
eliminated, then C will win as a compromise. Therefore I should bullet vote
for A at this point to give my candidate a fair chance against the opposite
candidate. B supporters will think the same way, if it looks balanced.
Therefore such a 3-way race will likely be a bullet vote for all candidates,
and with luck the compromise candidate will be eliminated without core
support, and the final will be between the poles A and B.

If either side believes it is in a clear minority, then they will offer the
centrist compromise, and probably the minority pole will be eliminated and
the centrist will win.

Overall near the end, the strategy is:
1. Vote your favorite.
2. Vote your compromise also if you are worried your favorite can't win.

There is a simplest degeneracy if you're really afraid - to bullet vote for
your compromise. This might happen if you think your favorite will defeat
your compromise but still lose.

Any election method that depends on elimination has a potential spoiler
effect where a favorite helps eliminate a compromise so both lose. This
isn't necessarily bad since it means voters have to decide what they want
and take the risk as they choose.

Well, the simple truth is that approval gives voters more power than
single-votes and with power comes risk of not getting what you want.
Approval is more work for voters than single votes.

Tom Ruen

----- Original Message -----
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
To: <election-methods-list at eskimo.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2001 6:40 PM
Subject: [EM] Comments--few voters, 0-info


>
>
> I was surprised & disappointed to find out that, with very few voters
> the above-mean strategy isn't valid in Approval. I kept denying it
> for a long time, not because it was something I didn't want to believe,
> but because it really seemed contrary to what I expected.
>
> As I said, it needn't be a problem for committees & meetings, where
> preliminary balloting is easily feasible, and so there's no need for
> a 0-info election.
>
> But the demnstration poll is an example of when a preliminary balloting
> isn't so feasible. It's difficult enough to get people to vote once,
> much less twice in the same poll.
>
> That, by the way, also argues against Tom's suggestion to use
> a runoff with Approval in the demonstation poll.
>
> By the way, if we agree that it's more democratic not to exclude anyone
> from the runoff, then Approval with Runoff just becomes Approval with
> a preliminary balloting by Approval. Since the balloting is of everyone
> who is voting, it can be assumed to be a very reliable prediction of
> how the alternatives will do.
>
> So what strategy do we use for Approval in the demonstration poll?
>
> Certainly there's a good mathematical 0-info strategy, for very few
> voters, in Approval. We just don't have it yet. Bart has suggested
> that a good Approval strategy is to just guess which set of candidates
> is the best to vote for. I don't like that, it seems to me much more
> of a wild guess than estimating our sincere ratings (and relevant
> probabilities if we have probability info). But it looks as if we're
> stuck with that guessing strategy right now, for very few voters and
> 0-info. But if we say to just guess which set of voters are the best
> to vote for, that doesn't get me anywhere--I don't know about you.
> The way I'd put it is: Guess which alternative(s) you most likely need
> as a lesser-evil compromise to keep something worse from winning.
>
> When we don't yet know how (with few voters) to use 0-info, which is
> the best assessment of what we have, we have to use very-questionable-
> guess-info, to vote an Approval ballot in the demonstration poll.
>
> I don't suggest that Approval be left out of the demonstration poll.
> Using it will demonstrate how we feel about the reliability & results
> of out questionable-guess-info strategy.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
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