[EM] Right to Left Majority Losers

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Using a place votes table, yet another tiebreaker involves a simple summing 
of place votes from the right to get majority losers when there is no 
Condorcet Winner.

Example-
     123
34 ABC
33 BCA
32 CAB

99

3rd plus 2nd place votes

A  65
B  66
C  67 loses

A beats B.

Expanding to 4 choices using Mr. Schulze's recent example-
-----
Example 1:

   3 voters vote A > B > C > D. 
   2 voters vote D > A > B > C.
   2 voters vote D > B > C > A.
   2 voters vote C > B > D > A.

   The pairwise matrix looks as follows:

   A:B=5:4
   A:C=5:4
   A:D=3:6
   B:C=7:2
   B:D=5:4
   C:D=5:4

   B and D are SSD winners. When SSD is re-applied among candidate B
   and candidate D, then candidate B wins decisively.

[End Schulze]
---
D- 4th plus 3rd place votes

A  4
B  2
C  7  Loses
D  5
  18

   3 voters vote A > B > D
   2 voters vote D > A > B
   2 voters vote D > B > A
   2 voters vote B > D > A

   A:B=5:4
   A:D=3:6
   B:D=5:4

Tie continues.

3rd plus 2nd place votes

A 6
B 7 loses
D 5
  18

D beats A.

Generally since there is

Desired > Compromise > Unacceptable

by eliminating (highest) majority unacceptable choices from the right to 
left, folks can vote for their desired choices as long as possible.

That is, a minority desired choice (even a 49.99 percent minority) may get 
eliminated (sorry for many folks --- liberal, conservative or whatever) BUT 
such minority should be encouraged to make lesser of evil choices among the 
remaining choices.   That is, for such minority group folks, when their 
desired choice loses, a compromise choice moves left/up on the ballots.

For legislative body elections the elimination amount would be just over the 
reverse Droop Quota for N seats --- Total Votes minus Droop Quota for N seats 
(with adjustments with few votes remaining and a few unfilled seats 
remaining).

The above is connected to clones and/or divided majorities..  *IF* clones 
and/or parts of a divided majority appear, then they shift the votes to the 
right. 

I note again the simple appearance of a third choice into 2 existing choices.

V1 votes AB
V2 votes BA

C appears.

Possible additonal vote combinations---

CAB, ACB, ABC
CBA, BCA, BAC

Whether C is a clone OR a part of a divided majority OR an *opposite* depends 
on the voters.