[EM] Puzzle example X 1000

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Mon Mar 5 16:05:00 PST 2001



>Then can you explain the following? I posted this at the end of my
>previous message:
>
>"If we replace voters 1, 2, and 3 with three groups of 1000 voters
>each, with the preferences and voting probabilities indicated in the
>example, then I think the mean utility strategy would work (because
>of the equal probabilities) even though it is not a true ZI case."

What's to explain? For one thing, it's a completely different example.
It isn't 0-info, but it isn't the initial example either. What the
strategy is for the new example has no bearing on 0-info strategy.

If it's as you say for the new example, that says nothing about
0-info strategy. But you haven't said what the strategy is for the
new example anyway.

This doesn't relate to the 0-info issue, but are you saying that each
group of 1000 as a whole, flips a coin to decide which way to vote and they 
all vote the same way? Or are you saying that each of them flips
a coin separately and decides individually based on that coin flip?

If it's the former, then your best strategy is to vote only for A.
Solve it in the same way as in the initial example. Same method,
different numbers, but same conclusion: Vote only for A.

If it's the latter, then it would probably be quicker & easier for
Joe than for you or me.

In any case, it's a completely different example, and so it has no
bearing on 0-info strategy.

Mike

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