Favorite Betrayal Criterion

[Forest Simmons]

On Thu, 26 Jul 2001, Forest Simmons wrote:

> There are precious few methods besides regular Approval that have been
> proposed which satisfy the FBC.
> 
> Demorep's ACMA and ACLA and other versions of Approval Completed Condorcet
> are among the few seriously proposed methods that satisfy this important
> property.
> 
> Another variation that seems to satisfy the FBC is this:
> 
> Of the two candidates with the most approval, take the one that is
> preferred over the other by the greater margin of voters.
> 
> This can be thought of as an instant runoff where the two candidates that
> qualify for the second (i.e. final) round are picked by Approval.

A variation of this method is to mark the approval cutoff by truncation:

Of the two candidates truncated by the fewest number of voters the
pairwise winner is the method winner.

I like the Five Slot Ballot version:

Of the two candidates with the greatest number of passing grades, the one
that is given a higher grade than the other by the greater number of
voters is the method winner.

Forest