Legality of "inverting" ballots by Condorcet.

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Simmons wrote in part-

My main disagreement with Demorep is that I tend to prefer the Approval
winner over the majority first place winner in the rare instances when the
two might differ. But I'm sure that the public would side with Demorep on
this issue. 

Example:

55 A > B >> C
45 C > B >> A

Demorep and most other people would say that A is the clear choice of the
people. The 45% minority lost the election fair and square. Let them tough
it out for the next four years.
---
D- As usual, I must note that ALL my comments about single winner methods 
relate to executive and judicial offices unless very clearly expressed to 
include legislative issues.  

Thus, once again in the 55 A > B >> C example -- 55 A > B --- a first place 
majority of the voters for A over B.

P.R. must be used in legislative body elections to get both indirect majority 
rule and minority representation.

Relating to Condorcet tiebreakers--

To add some major confusion in the brains of the strategic machination folks 
who vote insincerely  -- how about having a randomly chosen Condorcet 
tiebreaker if there is no Condorcet winner (or are no Condorcet winners -- 
with multiple executive and judicial offices) (assuming, as usual, that each 
winner has majority YES support). ???  

The voters would like, of course, an election to be determined by them and 
not a gambling type tiebreaker.