[EM] Richard's strategy method
Richard Moore
rmoore4 at home.com
Sun Feb 18 23:28:31 PST 2001
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> Richard, suppose you write an example that includes the
> input information that your method uses, and then use your
> method to show how the voter should vote in that example, in
> Approval.
OK, ZI strategy, four-way race. My utilities are A=100, B=70, C=50,
D = 0.
Assume a vote for a candidate increases that candidate's
likelihood of winning by 3%. Since I have no (reliable) outside
information, I must assume this 3% comes equally from the
other three candidates. Thus my vote decreases their chances
by 1% each. Also, I have no reason to believe the 3% increase
doesn't hold for all four candidates.
A is included regardless of the other utilities.
B is included if the incremental utility of a vote for B is positive.
This incremental utility is
-.01 * 100 + .03 * 70 - .01 * 50 - .01 * 0 = 0.6
so I include B.
The incremental utility for C is
-.01 * 100 - .01 * 70 + .03 * 50 - .01 * 0 = -0.2
so I don't include C. Given that C failed the test there is no reason
to crunch the numbers for D.
Non-ZI strategy: The information I use has to take the form
"a vote for i affects candidate j's chances of winning incrementally
by some percentage". This gives a matrix. The diagonal of the
matrix should be all positive numbers and the other elements
all negative (it's a monotonic election, after all). For this example
I'll use a 3-candidate race to keep the matrix small. I'll use
percentages here so I can start with whole numbers.
2 -1 -1
-1 3 -2
0 -1 1
A vote for i is represented by the ith row (each row must add up
to zero). The effect of that vote on candidate j can be found in the
jth column. Assume the candidates are numbered in order of
descending utilities, which are 100, 50, and 0.
A vote for the first candidate is a given, of course.
A vote for the second candidate has the following incremental
utility:
-.01 * 100 + .03 * 50 - .02 * 0 = 0.5
Since this is positive, I will also vote for B.
No need to run the numbers for C since the lowest-utility
candidate should never be voted for.
It's late; I apologize if this contains any arithmetic errors but
I think it illustrates the procedure.
> That example would show how workable your method actually is.
>
> How would you determine the probabilities that you use--or would
> you estimate them directly?
For the ZI case this is simple -- use +1 for the candidate under
consideration, -1/(N-1) for the other N-1 candidates. Only relative
values are important, so any set of numbers that maintains the same
ratio could be used.
The non-ZI case could only be solved for information of a given nature.
Are you using a poll? If so, do you feel comfortable in assuming that
the only source of error in the poll is random statistical sampling?
Are you using historical data that shows members of party X are 5%
more likely to turn out at the polls than party Y? The information can
take
many forms so there is no one-size-fits-all way of calculating the
probability deltas, and it's quite likely you won't be able to account
for all the error sources. So for non-ZI strategy an old-fashioned
neural
network may still be your best bet. It's been pointed out that this
academic analysis is of more theoretical than practical value. Also, as
I
said previously, in an approval election I would tend to just go with ZI
strategy anyway.
-- Richard
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