[EM] Some Voting Tables

[Richard Moore]

Richard Moore wrote:

> A full analysis through game theory might be interesting. But what types
> of strategic cooperation need to be considered? I can see that an analysis
> would be feasible if cooperation within factions is allowed (there would
> be 46x31x26 combinations to consider, an easy task for a computer), but
> if cooperation between factions is to be considered, it would be extremely
> complicated.

Here's another way to think about this: Suppose faction A makes some 
assumptions
about the probability distributions of the 31 possible (strategically 
sensible)
ways the B faction can vote and the 26 possible ways the C faction can vote.
For each of the A faction's 46 possible mixes (ranging from 45 A, 0 AB to
0 A, 45 AB), they could then calculate the expected utility and choose the
one mix that maximizes that expectation. This choice clearly will lower the
expected utilities of at least one of the B and C factions. But if the
"victim" faction anticipates this, they could gain by choosing a strategy
contrary to what the A faction assumed.

It reminds me of the stock market, where it often pays to use a contrarian
strategy. But that doesn't work when everybody is a contrarian, does it?

  -- Richard