royone at yahoo.com
Wed Aug 29 09:42:35 PDT 2001
Forest Simmons wrote:
> The entry in the i_th row and j_th column M(i,j) is a one or a zero
> depending on whether or not this ballot has a higher rating for
> candidate i than for candidate j .
IMO, this gives too much weight to rankings and not enough to
ratings. The collapsing strategy uses ratings, but it is only used to
resolve cycles. I don't think that, given the information on a CR
ballot, the Condorcet criterion should apply.
Consider (sincere ratings):
Voters rate A rate B rate C
20 100 50 0
10 50 0 100
70 90 100 0
B is clearly the Condorcet winner, but choosing A brings the rest of
the voters into the represented group, without badly compromising the
preferences of the majority. When you know the strength of a
preference, you can do better than when you only know that a
If M(i,j) is rating(i)-rating(j), counting only where rating(i) >
rating(j), I suspect the results will always be the same as the
ordinary way of processing CR. It yields A>B>C for my example.
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