[EM] Dyadic approval implemented as CR
rmoore4 at home.com
Thu Aug 23 21:01:50 PDT 2001
> How about a CR ballot that is scored as Dyadic approval? Votes in the
> top half of the ratings scale score 1 point (in a pairwise matrix)
> over those in the bottom half. Within a half, those in the upper half-
> of-the-half score a half point over those in the lower. And so forth.
> Sum the matrices, run a Condorcet method.
Part of the appeal of the dyadic ballots is that they offer
more expressivity than mere rank voting. So you can not only
say that you like B better than C (B>C), you can say you
like B much, much better than C (B>>>C). But this binary
scoring method loses that advantage. In fact, if we use
summation, and I assume you mean "sum the rows", it's an
approximation to Borda (with a power-of-two number of
candidates it *is* Borda, if we ignore tied rankings) so I
would think it has Borda's strategy problems. If we use a
Condorcet method instead, it seems like we haven't gained
anything over the Condorcet method with ordinary ranked
ballots. Am I missing something?
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