[EM] Introduction (cont.)

Roy royone at yahoo.com
Wed Aug 8 14:34:18 PDT 2001

Buddha Buck <bmbuck at 1...> wrote:
> The problem is that if you think
> Albert might lose, you have to throw more support behind Bill, so 
> your #1 compromise candidate has the best chance of winning.  So
> Bill's ranking get's pushed higher, to increase his chances.  If you
> have any doubts about Albert's electability, then you push Bill as
> high as possible -- say, to 100 as well.
> Basically, if you have any fears that Dave, Edward, or Frank could
> win, it's in your best strategy to push Bill and Charles to max as
> well as Albert.

You discount the fear that B will beat A compared to the fear that 
one of the others will beat B. At the risk of repeating what I just 
posted to Richard Moore, if the voter perceives that the real contest 
doesn't include his best and worst, he will re-normalize based on the 
extremes of those he does consider to be in the contest -- that can, 
but does not necessarily, degenerate to Approval. I don't think that, 
in reality, the ability to perceive the probability of a candidate's 
being elected gets much finer-grained than zero/close/landslide.

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