[EM] Introduction (cont.)
rmoore4 at home.com
Fri Aug 3 20:02:13 PDT 2001
Douglas Greene wrote:
> In brief:
> "In this system, you provide a k-tuple of real numbers,
> each in some fixed range (Smith uses -1 to 1, but 0-1
> and 0-10 are other popular choices; all are equivalent)
> as your "vote" in a k-candidate election.
> For simplicity, let us, like Olympic figure skating judges,
> use the range 0-10. Consider a 4-way election
> with candidates (Buchanan, Bush, Gore, Nader).
> You could provide, as your vote, the 4-tuple
> (0, 2, 9, 10). All the vote-tuples are then added up,
> and the winner is the candidate with the largest
> total. For example, if this vote and also somebody else's vote
> (6, 10, 0, 8) were added, we would get
> (6, 12, 9, 18). The largest total would be 18
> so (if these were the only two voters),
> Nader would be the winner."
> I'm delighted I found this list. It's heartening to know that there
> are others out there who haven't bought into the CVD line.
If I'm not mistaken this is the same as what we've referred
to on this list as Cardinal Ratings (CR). This is a very
good system as long as the voters have no reason to vote
strategically (impartial judges in a contest, for instance).
As soon as voters begin to vote strategically, they will
exagerrate their preferences, rating candidates either 0 or
10, so that the system becomes equivalent to Approval. Of
course, that doesn't make it a bad system, since Approval is
a good system; it just doesn't have any advantage over
Approval in such applications.
More information about the Election-Methods