[EM] Introduction (cont.)

Richard Moore rmoore4 at home.com
Fri Aug 3 20:02:13 PDT 2001

Douglas Greene wrote:
> In brief:
> "In this system, you provide a k-tuple of real numbers,
> each in some fixed range (Smith uses -1 to 1, but 0-1
> and 0-10 are other popular choices; all are equivalent)
> as your "vote" in a k-candidate election.
> For simplicity, let us, like Olympic figure skating judges,
> use the range 0-10. Consider a 4-way election
> with candidates (Buchanan, Bush, Gore, Nader).
> You could provide, as your vote, the 4-tuple
> (0, 2, 9, 10). All the vote-tuples are then added up,
> and the winner is the candidate with the largest
> total. For example, if this vote and also somebody else's vote
> (6, 10, 0, 8) were added, we would get
> (6, 12, 9, 18). The largest total would be 18
> so (if these were the only two voters),
> Nader would be the winner."
> I'm delighted I found this list.  It's heartening to know that there
> are others out there who haven't bought into the CVD line.
> Doug


If I'm not mistaken this is the same as what we've referred 
to on this list as Cardinal Ratings (CR). This is a very 
good system as long as the voters have no reason to vote 
strategically (impartial judges in a contest, for instance).
As soon as voters begin to vote strategically, they will 
exagerrate their preferences, rating candidates either 0 or 
10, so that the system becomes equivalent to Approval. Of 
course, that doesn't make it a bad system, since Approval is 
a good system; it just doesn't have any advantage over 
Approval in such applications.


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