[EM] Responses to some of Forest's ideas

[Rob LeGrand]

A while ago, Craig wrote:
>  9 A>B>C>D=E=F : 100>90>1>0=0=0     : ZI AB  : St AB
> 38 B>D>A>C=E=F : 100>52>51>0=0=0    : ZI BDA : St B
> 40 C>B>A>D=E=F : 100>85>70>0=0=0    : ZI CBA : St C
>  9 D>C>B>A=E=F : 100>10>9>0=0=0     : ZI DC  : St DC
>  4 E=F>A>B>C>D : 100=100>90>12>10>0 : ZI EFA : St EFA
>
> Undefeated (definite) Condorcet Winner is B.  Zero info approval winner
> (taking both mean and median into account) is A.  Strategic approval winner
> is C.  It seems pretty clear that I've used optimal strategy, although I
> haven't done all the math.

I'd say B and C would shape up to be the frontrunners, and the best strategic
approval votes would be:

 9 AB
38 B
40 C
 9 DC
 4 EFAB

Whichever two candidates emerge to be the frontrunners, B should be one of them
and win.  Won't the strategic approval winner always be the sincere Condorcet
winner when one exists?

=====
Rob LeGrand
honky98 at aggies.org
http://www.aggies.org/honky98/

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