[EM] Responses to some of Forest's ideas
honky1998 at yahoo.com
Sat Aug 18 16:14:36 PDT 2001
A while ago, Craig wrote:
> 9 A>B>C>D=E=F : 100>90>1>0=0=0 : ZI AB : St AB
> 38 B>D>A>C=E=F : 100>52>51>0=0=0 : ZI BDA : St B
> 40 C>B>A>D=E=F : 100>85>70>0=0=0 : ZI CBA : St C
> 9 D>C>B>A=E=F : 100>10>9>0=0=0 : ZI DC : St DC
> 4 E=F>A>B>C>D : 100=100>90>12>10>0 : ZI EFA : St EFA
> Undefeated (definite) Condorcet Winner is B. Zero info approval winner
> (taking both mean and median into account) is A. Strategic approval winner
> is C. It seems pretty clear that I've used optimal strategy, although I
> haven't done all the math.
I'd say B and C would shape up to be the frontrunners, and the best strategic
approval votes would be:
Whichever two candidates emerge to be the frontrunners, B should be one of them
and win. Won't the strategic approval winner always be the sincere Condorcet
winner when one exists?
honky98 at aggies.org
Do You Yahoo!?
Make international calls for as low as $.04/minute with Yahoo! Messenger
More information about the Election-Methods