[EM] Fine-grained option

Jeandré jeandre at techie.com
Sat Aug 4 04:54:36 PDT 2001


My understanding of voting systems are still very limited. I'd appreciate critique on 
the following:

The fine-grained option voting system.

A "binding none of the above" (BNOTA) option, and space to comment is required for all
referenda. If BNOTA wins, the most popular comments will be incorporated in the revote.

All spoilt votes will be counted as BNOTA votes.

If multiple winners are required, those with the highest number of votes win. If BNOTA
places within the required number of winners wanted, the entire vote needs to be
retaken taking popular comments into account.

If a single winning option is required, the option with 50%+ of the votes wins; failing
a 50%+ winner, a revote must be taken including comments; if again no option wins 50%+
there is no winner/action-taken.

//Should there be different systems for 1 winner vs. multiple winner referenda?

When a quorum is required the number of members who did not vote will be counted as
BNOTA votes.

All ballots are anonymous. Coments will later be made available in detailed reports by
the referendum administrators, with attributions removed.

Voters may vote for a single option, vote for several, rank as many as they want
(giving their favourite a 1 and writing in incrimental ranks for all the options they
approve of) or allot percentages to whatever options they want.

All ballot choices add up to 1 vote:

If they choose just one option, with an X, it gets 1 vote.

If they vote for several options, with an X, those options each get an equal percentage
of the vote: 1 ÷ number of votes (NOV), e.g.: 4 selections means all 4 options get 0.25
of a vote.

If they rank several of the options, the highest ranking (1) will get an bigger 
fraction than lower ranked votes. This is calculated by first taking the lowest 
(biggest number) ranking option and giving it: number of options ÷ rank ÷ NOV ÷ number 
of options. The next biggest vote's share is then calculated by adding the previous 
value to the same calculation. A table with these values can be drawn up allowing 
people without computerized systems to easily tally the vote. If the rankings are not 
correctly incrimented or don't start at 1, the ballot is spoilt and BNOTA gets 1 vote.

If percentages are given, and it doesn't add up to 100% the vote is spoilt.




E.g.:

Should controversial Foo be done?
X  Yes
    No
    Binding none of the above
Comment:

(1 vote for yes)


or

    Yes
    No
X  Binding none of the above
Comment: Only as long it's done in a humane way and regulated by the SPCA.

(1 vote for BNOTA, with a comment that may be added to the revote if BNOTA wins and the
idea commented on is popular.)


or

    Yes
    No
X  Binding none of the above
Comment: Anarchy rules dude!!

(1 vote for BNOTA.)


or

X  Yes
X  No
    Binding none of the above
Comment:

(0.5 of a vote for both yes and no, illogical but allowed.)





Who should be on the 3 member executive co-ordination commitee?
X  Ann Clayborne
X  Frank Chalmers
    Hiroko Ai
X  John Boone
    Phyllis Boyle
    Saxifrage Russel
    Simon Fraser
X  Tatiana Durova
    Vlad Taneev
    Binding none of the above
Comment: Arkady Bogdanov, Nadia Cherneshevsky

(0.25 of a vote for each of the selected candidates. Eventho BNOTA did not get a vote,
if it places within the winners and Arkady and Nadia are popular comments, and they
accept the nominations, they will be added to the revote.)


or

2  Ann Clayborne
    Frank Chalmers
    Hiroko Ai
    John Boone
    Phyllis Boyle
    Saxifrage Russel
    Simon Fraser
    Tatiana Durova
    Vlad Taneev
1  Binding none of the above
Comment: Arkady Bogdanov, Nadia Cherneshevsky

(0.75 of a vote for BNOTA, 0.25 for Ann. If BNOTA wins a place within the
number of options wanted, a revote is required. If Arkady and Nadia are popular
comments, and they accept the nominations, they will be included in the revote.)


or

1  Ann Clayborne
2  Arkady Bogdanov
    Frank Chalmers
    John Boone
3  Nadia Cherneshevsky
    Binding none of the above
Comment:

(0.61r of a vote for Ann, 0.27r for Arkady, and 0.11r for Nadia.)


or

1  Ann Clayborne
2  Arkady Bogdanov
    Frank Chalmers
4  Hiroko Ai
    John Boone
3  Nadia Cherneshevsky
    Saxifrage Russel
    Simon Fraser
    Tatiana Durova
5  Binding none of the above
Comment:

(0.456r of a vote for Ann, 0.256r for Arkady, 0.156r for Nadia, 0.09 for Hiroko, and 
0.04 for BNOTA.)


or

1  Ann Clayborne
2  Arkady Bogdanov
    Frank Chalmers
4  Hiroko Ai
    John Boone
3  Nadia Cherneshevsky
    Saxifrage Russel
    Simon Fraser
    Tatiana Durova
    Binding none of the above
Comment:

(0.52083r of a vote for Ann, 0.27083r for Arkady, 0.14583r for Nadia, and 0.0625 for 
Hiroko)


or

40%  Ann Clayborne
45%  Arkady Bogdanov
      Frank Chalmers
      Hiroko Ai
      John Boone
10%  Nadia Cherneshevsky
      Saxifrage Russel
      Simon Fraser
      Tatiana Durova
  5%  Binding none of the above
Comment:

(0.45 of a vote for Arkady, 0.4 for Ann, 0.1 for Nadia, and 0.05 for BNOTA.)
-- 
Jeandré
jeandre at techie.com




More information about the Election-Methods mailing list